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THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF PREGNANT
WOMEN WHO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
APRIL L. CHERRY*

I. INTRODUCTION

Pregnant women do not generally refuse to follow the treatment plans
outlined by their attending physicians. Therefore, when they do refuse to
submit to medical procedures that physicians deem are either beneficial to
pregnant women or their fetuses, legal and ethical issues may arise. Law
Professor Michelle Oberman has recently noted, "At the center of the...
debate is the question of when and whether it is appropriate for the law to
dictate a pregnant woman's behavior in an effort to benefit her unborn fetus."'
Ethicist Laura Purdy has phrased the moral question a bit differently. She
asks, "[W]hat do we owe others? More particularly, what do we owe others
who do not yet exist? And, most particularly, what legally enforceable duties
toward such future persons can be exacted of us?"2 I would also ask, what

moral duties do we owe those who already exist? Do we owe them respect for
their autonomy and bodily integrity? If so, can we protect our moral duties

towards those who already exist with the power of law?
The American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology (ACOG), and the American Public Health Association
disfavor legal intervention when a pregnant woman refuses medical
treatment.3 The appellate courts in two leading jurisdictions have refused to
compel treatment on the basis of a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical

Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Yale Law School. A special thanks to Professors
Patricia Falk and Margaret Baldwin for insightful discussions regarding the arguments in this
Article as well as for their comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also go to my colleagues
Professors Linda Ammons, DenaDavis, Lynne Henderson, Patricia McCoy, Michelle Oberman,
and James Wilson fortheirhelpful comments on earlier drafts, to students Tiffany Anderson and
Grace Lockett for their excellent research assistance, and to the Cleveland-Marshall Summer
Research Grant Program for its financial support.
1. Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's
FiduciaryRole in Maternal-FetalConflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 451, 452 (2000).
2. LAI AM. PURDY, REPRODUCINGPERSONS: IssuEs IN FEMMNIST BIOETHICS 93 (1996).
3. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1248 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (citing Brief of
Amici Curiae American Public Health Association); Board of Trustees, American Medical
Association, LegalInterventions DuringPregnancy: Court OrderedMedical Treatments and
PregnantWomen, 264 JAMA 2663, 2665Legal PenaltiesforPotentiallyHarmfulBehaviorby
66 (1990) [hereinafter AMA, Legal InterventionsDuringPregnancy];ACOG Comm. on Ethics,
Op. 55 PatientChoice: Maternal-FetalConflict (1987) [hereinafter ACOG, Patient Choice]
*
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treatment,4 and the overwhelming sense among medical, legal, and ethics
scholars is that judicial action is inappropriate and unwarranted for a host of
reasons.' Rejecting those professional policy preferences, physicians and
hospitals nevertheless increasingly resort to the legal system in order to
compel non-consensual treatment on pregnant women.' Trial and juvenile
courts have followed the physicians' lead and have repeatedly compelled
pregnant women to submit to medical procedures that the women themselves
deem unnecessary or undesirable.
Some women acquiesce in the face of judicial orders,' others leave the
hospital in order to escape the assault,' some escape only to be picked up by
law enforcement officials,9 while others continue to fight the court orders and
as a consequence are sedated and restrained.' ° In most cases, trial courts

4. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (111. App. Ct. 1997); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326 (I1. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235.
5. See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, PrenatalInvasionsand Interventions: What's Wrong with
FetalRights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered
ObstetricalInterventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987); Susan Marken, Feeding the
Fetus: On Interrogatingthe Notion ofMaternal-FetalConflict, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 351 (1997);
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Rebekah R. Arch, Comment, The Maternal-Fetal
Rights Dilemma: HonoringA Woman 's Choice of Medical Care DuringPregnancy, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 637 (1996). But see, e.g., Phillip Johnson, The ACLU
Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, in EXPECTING TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL
ABUSE & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 135-41 (Patricia Boling ed. 1995); John A.
Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Controlof Conception,Pregnancy,and Childbirth, 69
VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty].
6.

See RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 95

(2000) (noting that Professor Lori Andrews reports that one California obstetrician stated that
he obtained 49 out of 50 court orders he sought for cesarean section surgeries for nonconsenting pregnant women, and that the doctor's record exceeds all published accounts of
forced cesareans in law and medical journals). There are also reports of doctors performing
non-consensual medical procedures on pregnant women for the sake of the fetus without court
orders. See, e.g., Ronna Jurow & Richard H. Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress
Without Maternal Consent, 63 OBsTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 596, 599 (1984) (recounting
physician's assertion that it would be unlikely for a woman to sue because she would have the
burden, in a medical malpractice suit, to prove that a "reasonably prudent person in the patient's
circumstances would have refused").
7. See, e.g., Application of the President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,377 U.S. 978 (1964) ("1 asked her whether she would
oppose the blood transfusion if the court allowed it. She indicated, as best I could make out,
that it would not then be her responsibility.").
8. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981); see also Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1159-60 (discussing Jefferson).
9. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
1249-50 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
10. See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 9-10 (discussing the case of a Nigerian woman who
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simply defer to the judgments of medical science regarding the nature and
probabilities of impending harm, which in the case of pregnancy, have proven
to be incorrect on many occasions to be incorrect." They also defer to the
moral belief system of the physician, which at the very least imbues the fetus
with the status of patient.1 2 The legal rationales used by these courts tend to
focus upon the state's interest in a viable fetus, which courts often judge to
outweigh any and all interest that the pregnant woman may have in her own
medical treatment and the life and health of her fetus.
In a majority of the reported cases, women resist the treatment suggestions
ofphysicians, at least in part, on the basis of deeply held religious beliefs. Some
opinions involve refusals of blood transfusions. These refusals generally come
from women who are Jehovah's Witnesses and, as such, are prohibited from
accepting blood and blood-related products into their bodies." The other

refused to consent to a cesarean section even after the court ordered it: "The woman became
combative and was placed in full leathers .... Despite her restraints, the woman continued to
scream for help and bit through her intravenous tubing in an attempt to get free.") (quoting V.
Kolder, Women's Health Law: A Feminist Perspective, 1-2 (Aug. 1985) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal)); see also In re Fetus Brown, 689
N.E.2d 397,400 (III. App. Ct. 1997).
11. In several reported cases, physician predictions of fetal and maternal harm or death
have been mistaken. For example, in Jefferson, despite the prediction of maternal and fetal
death due to placenta previa, Mrs. Jefferson delivered a healthy child vaginally and without the
assistance of any hospital personnel. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1959-60; see also Kolder et al.,
supra note 5, at 1194. Similarly, in In re Baby Boy Doe, despite predictions of mental
retardation if the woman forwent a cesarean section, the woman vaginally delivered a healthy
baby. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also BARBARA
KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL

(1989) (citing to additional cases of inaccurate physician predictions of fetal or
maternal harm).
12. Obstetricians are taught to, and often do, view the pregnant woman as two patients.
See, e.g., GARY CUNNINGHAM ETAL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS VII (21st ed. 2001). For acritique
of the two-patient model, see Susan Mattingly, The Maternal-FetalDyad: Exploringthe TwoPatient ObstetricModel, 22 HASTINGS CR. REP. 13 (1992), cited in Oberman, supra note 1,
at 468. ACOG is also of the opinion that the pregnant woman represents two patients, although
it also recognizes that the pregnant woman is the only one of the two patients who is able to
give informed consent and, as a result, disfavors legal intervention to compel treatment. See
ACOG, Patient Choice, supra note 3. As I have argued elsewhere, for doctors, and for our
culture more generally, the ability to see the fetus through the imaging technology of
sonography has been in part responsible for this perceived duality of pregnant woman and fetus.
See April Cherry, Maternal-FetalConflicts, The Social Construction ofMaternalDeviance,
and Some Thoughts About Love and Justice, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 245, 248 (1999); see also
ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 115; Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of
Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263 (1987).
13. As of 1994, there were approximately 4.9 million active Jehovah's Witnesses
worldwide, 950,000 of them living in the United States. ROBERT M. BOWMAN, JR., JEHOVAH'S
WrrNEsSES 14(1995). One tenet of their faith is the refusal of blood transfusions. It is based
SOCIETY
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principal refusal is consent to cesarean section surgery. These women tend
not to come from one particular religious sect, but often describe themselves,
or are described by the courts, as "fundamentalist" Christians. 4
Although most of the pregnant women in the reported cases assert a claim
of religious freedom, neither scholars nor courts sufficiently address the free
exercise claim. Rather, scholars tend to address the claims under the privacy
doctrine, 5 and most courts simply do not address the free exercise objections
to medical treatment asserted by the pregnant women. Those courts that do
address the objections merely assume that a woman's right to the free exercise
of her religious beliefs regarding her own health care and the health care of
the fetus is easily overridden by whatever interest the state may have in the
woman's fetus. This assumption, without legal support or analysis, is
particularly disrespectful of the claims of religious minorities and is
inappropriate if the free exercise clause is to have any meaning in the lives of
those whose faith guides them in these matters. In order to have some
assurance regarding the constitutional status of these religiously motivated
refusals, courts must analyze these refusals in reference to free exercise
jurisprudence, the right to refuse medical treatment, and the state's actual
interest in a viable fetus. In this Article I do just that.
This Article is very much about "rights," although I acknowledge the
potential dangers of rights discourse, particularly when the provision of rights
are divorced from the real needs of the people they are nominally designed to
assist. In such a context, rights result in limited substantive justice.' 6 In the
on their reading of the mandate found in Leviticus 17, which states, "If anyone of the house of
Israel or of the aliens who reside among them eats any blood, I will set my face against that
person who eats blood, and will cut that person off from the people. For the life of the flesh is
in the blood." Leviticus 17:10-11 (New Revised Standard). Violation of this tenet can lead to
loss of salvation as well as disfellowship. BOWMAN, supra,at 14; Dena S. Davis, Does "No "
Mean "Yes"?: The Continuing Problem of Jehovah's Witnesses and Refusal of Blood
Products, SECOND OPINION, Jan. 1994, at 35. For a fuller description of the beliefs regarding

blood transfusions of Jehovah's Witnesses and the legal and ethical consequences of legally
coerced transfusions, see Davis, supra.
14. For example, the pregnant women in Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395,396 (Mass. 1983)
and in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. 1981) are

described as either fundamentalist or born-again Christians. Ninian Smart offers a definition
of fundamentalism in the Christian context:
[F]undamentalism means taking the Bible as literally inerrant or as "literal where
possible".... In the Christian context it is associated with evangelicalism--that is, the
belief in the authority of the Bible, the claim that salvation can only come through close

personal faith in Christ, the regeneration of spiritual life, typically through some
conversion experience, and a transformation of moral life, including typically Biblereading, prayer, abstention from specified wickedness ....
NIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 378 (2d ed. 1998).
15. See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understandingof Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a
Matter of Choice?, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 214 (1995); see also SHERENE H. RAZACK,
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case of the compelled medical treatment of pregnant women, rights talk can
divert our attention away from the social and economic conditions under
which women live and, more particularly, under which they experience
pregnancy and childbirth.' Nevertheless, rights discourse also has immense
value. As Professor Patricia Williams notes, rights "speak[] to an
establishment that values the guise of stability, and from [which] social
change for the better must come (whether it is given, taken or smuggled)."'"
For women, claiming rights has additional, if not radical results. Rights
discourse and the assertion of rights has enabled women, as individuals and
as a group, to vindicate their self-worth. Indeed, women's assertion of rights
is especially important given that women have historically been denied selfsovereignty due to the rights, that is, legal power, exercised over them by their
husbands and fathers.' 9 Hence rights can be transformative by dismantling
unjustified privilege.2" In the context of the forced medical treatment of
pregnant women who refuse treatment on the basis of religious belief, rights
discourse has considerable merit. It speaks to the very real needs of women
for social change as it requires us to respect the bodies and the very personal
choices of women regardless of whether we understand or agree with those
choices. Rights discourse also works to dismantle the unjustified power of
physicians over the lives of pregnant women.
In Part II, I outline the values protected by the free exercise clause. I also
analyze modem free exercise jurisprudence, ending with the status of religious
exemptions from laws of general applicability since the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,2' which severely limits the situations

LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND
CLASSROOMS 33 (1998) ("[The idea of rights regulates the discussion and hides 'the complex,

multi-faceted structure ofdomination in modem patriarchy."'); John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a
MulticulturalWorld, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 2129, 2215 (1992) ("This process whereby rights are
defined by law, however, is substantially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights

and the values they envisaged.").
17. In addition, Professor Lisa Ikemoto argues that rights discourse allows us to ignore
"the prior devaluation of women; that 'fetal interests' is a proxy for majoritarian interests; and
that the [Roe v. Wade] balancing test describes women as tools useful for serving the rest of
society." Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furtheringthe Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced
Medical Treatment ofPregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REv. 487, 499 (1992).
18. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdealsfrom Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,410 (1987).
19. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist CritiqueofRights Analysis, 63 TEx.
L. REV. 387, 388-91 (1984) (discussing the value of rights for women); cf.Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement,

61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 652 (1986) ("Rights can be what we make of them ...").
20.

See Martha Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L.

REV. 1659, 1679 (1995).
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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in which strict scrutiny will be applied to analyze government actions that
compels a religious believer to act contrary to her beliefs.
In Part III, I first discuss the law regarding the right to refuse medical
treatment. I then explore the states' rationales for using the force of law on
pregnant women who resist medical treatment that might benefit their fetuses.
This Part concludes with a close examination of the reported cases of
compelled medical treatment of pregnant women, in particular those cases in
which the women have asserted religious motivations for their refusals to
comply with physicians' orders.22 This examination provides the factual
context in which the refusals are made and in which treatment is judicially
compelled. I conclude that the rationales given by the courts in these cases are
profoundly flawed, most particularly because they depend upon a
misunderstanding of the state's interest in a viable fetus, as well as a mistaken
understanding of a pregnant woman's interest in her own health care and her
interest in the health and life of her fetus.
Finally, in Part IV, I analyze the free exercise of religion claims made by
pregnant women in the non-consensual treatment cases. I conclude that even
in a post-Smith world, the state must prove that it has a compelling interest in
order to mandate treatment, which indeed it cannot. The state interest in a
viable fetus is simply not compelling outside the context of abortion.
Pregnant women retain the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment
even if such refusals work to the detriment of their fetuses.
HT.THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof....
-U.S. Constitution, First Amendment
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
-U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment

The idea that the Constitution protects the rights of American citizens in
the exercise of their religious beliefs against government interference or
intrusion is a deeply held notion, rooted in the American tradition ofreligious
liberty that dates back to a time before the founding of our nation.2 3 The First

22. 1 mean "orders" here-if the physician's directions were merely suggestions for
treatment, then they would not have the force of law. Nevertheless, the force of law issue turns
on judicial enforcement rather than a doctor's designation per se.
23. For a discussion of the history of religious liberty, see Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding ofFree Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409,
1425, 1513-17 (1990); David C. Snyder, John Locke and the Freedom ofBelief 30 J. CHURCH
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Amendment religious liberty clauses, the Free Exercise and non-Establishment
Clauses, resulted from this tradition. Nevertheless the First Amendment, in
addition to other protections found in the Bill of Rights, did not apply to the
states at the time of its adoption in 1791 .24The First Amendment religious
liberty clauses constrained only the federal government from intrusion into the
religious lives of the citizenry.25 In fact, the Court did not apply the Free
Exercise Clause to the activity of state government until 1940. That year, in
Cantwell v. Connecticut,2 6 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated2 7 the religious liberty clauses of the First
Amendment, "render[ing] the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws."2 8 Moreover, it was not until 1947 that the

Supreme Court held that governmental neutrality was essential to religious
liberty and thus required by the First Amendment.2 9

A. Values Underlyingthe Free Exercise Clause
Although much disagreement exists injudicial and academic circles regarding
the breadth of values safeguarded by the free exercise clause,3" three core values
are deemed central: freedom of expression, neutrality, and freedom of belief or
conscience.
Freedom of expression requires that religious speech be protected against
all government regulation, save government regulation founded upon a
compelling state need.3 Freedom of expression in this context also requires

AND ST.

227 (1988);

see also EDWIN S. GAUSTAD,A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RE11GION IN

AMERICA TO THE Clvii WAR 259-275 (2d ed. 1993).

24. The First Amendment was proposed in 1789.
25. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Council, 32 U.S. 243,246 (1"833) (stating that the
Bill of Rights protects citizens against congressional action only; it offers no protection against
state or local governments).
26. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27. Incorporation is "[t]he process of applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as encompassing those
provisions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769-70 (7th ed. 1999).
28. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; cf.Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947)
(noting that non-establishment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that freedom of speech is incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
29. In Everson, the Court held that the First "Amendment requires the state to be a neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state
to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is
to favor them." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
30. See BETTE NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PLURAUSM 11 (1997).

31. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,272-73 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943); cf.W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,634-36,642
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that the state not single out religious speech for exclusion in state institutions;
instead religious speech must be given equal time and access with secular
speech.32
Neutrality is valued for both theological and political reasons. As the
Court in McCollum v. BoardofEducation" noted, "the First Amendment rests
upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere." 34 Michael Sandel points to an additional, and perhaps, more
important justification for state neutrality in the face of religion: individual
freedom and the dangers to it from state coercion.35 Sandel maintains:
On this justification, the state must be neutral not only to avoid
compromising religion and provoking sectarian strife, but also to avoid the
danger of coercion....
In contemporary liberalism. . religious liberty serves the broader
mission of protecting individual autonomy. On this view, government
should be neutral toward religion for the same reason it should be neutral
toward competing conceptions of the good life generally-to respect
people's capacity to choose their own values and ends.36
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently pointed to the goal of noncoercion in promoting the constitutional value of neutrality. For example, in
Abington v. Schempp,3 the Court, in justifying the requirement of
governmental neutrality, opined that it is "the right of every person to freely
choose his own [religious] course.., free of any compulsion from the state."3
Neutrality, and hence non-coercion, even in their weakest versions, are valued
also because they protect religious believers, particularly those of minority

(1943) (noting that religious speech is protected under the speech clause of the First
Amendment; the Court did not reach the free exercise question).
32. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(holding that denying a church after-hours access to school meeting room violates the First
Amendment because the district was favoring one viewpoint over another); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that the University of Virginia discriminated against
religious student groups prohibiting religious groups from meeting on campus when it allowed
secular groups that privilege).
33. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34. Id. at 212; see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 246
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF
FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

PHILOSOPHY 74-92, 84-85 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
36. Id. at 85, 88.
37. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
38. Id. at 222.
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faiths, 3 9 from state-sponsored discrimination on the basis of religion.'

The

Court has alluded to this anti-discrimination justification on many occasions.
For example, in its 1947 opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,4 ' the
Court reasoned that "[s]tate power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them." 2 More recently, in the 1993 case of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,43 the Court linked the
neutrality requirement with the protection of religious minorities from
coercion and discriminatory treatment, finding that "[iun sum, the neutrality
inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the
suppression of religion." Hence, governmental neutrality, as a method of
protecting the believer from coercion and discrimination, promotes the
freedom of belief and its component, religious exercise.
Neutrality, in its most diluted and most formal sense, requires that the
state neither favor nor disfavor religion nor treat religious ideas or citizens

39. The terms "religious minorities" and "minority religions or faiths" refers to three,
often overlapping groups. First, it applies to religions that are a numerical minority in the
United States and that lack the political power ofmainstream American religions. It is also used
to refer to religions, such as the Native American Church and Santeria, that lack characteristics
common to the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), including formal churches,
monotheism, and standardized church personnel; or churches like the Jehovah's Witnesses and
The Church of the Latter Day Saints, that self-identify as Christian but do not share many core
mainstream Christian beliefs. Lastly, these terms may also refer to "those religious/practices
beliefs that are followed [primarily] by 'minority' persons." Verna Sanchez, Looking Upward
and Inward: Religion and Critical Theory, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 431,432 (1998); see
also Verna C. Sanchez, All Roads Are Good. Beyond the Lexicon of Christianity in Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 34-35, 75 (1997); Verna C. Sanchez,
Whose God is it Anyway?: The Supreme Court, The Orishas, and Grandfather Peyote, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 39, 60 (1994).
40. Douglas Laycock argues that the understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as
prohibiting only formal inequality misinterprets the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise
Clause is not simply redundant of the Equal Protection Clause. Laycock argues,
[T]he Free Exercise Clause creates a substantive right, and the Court [in Smith] has
reduced it to a mere equality right. The Free Exercise Clause does not say that Congress
shall make no law discriminating against religion, or that no state shall denyto any religion
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Rather, it says that Congress shall
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.... On its face, this is a substantive
entitlement, and not merely a pledge of non-discrimination.
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 13 [hereinafter
Laycock, Remnants]; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1139 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism].
41. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
42. Id. at 18.
43. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
44. Id. at 542.
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differently from secular ideas or citizens."5 Under this conception of
neutrality, government's only obligation is that it not single out religion for
discriminatory treatment.' Hence under formal neutrality, laws that are not
facially neutral toward religion, as well as generally applicable laws that
exempt religious believers, are unconstitutional. Both are based on religious
classifications, and hence are not strictly neutral toward religion.
Nevertheless, reliance on formal neutrality is problematic. Like formal
equality in the equal protection arena, formal neutrality can, and often does,
"reinforce[] substantive inequalit[y] when background conditions are
unequal."4' 7 Theories of "substantive" neutrality seek to avoid this pitfall.
Neutrality, viewed as a more substantive requirement, demands that
"government . . . minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance
or nonobservance.... Government should not interfere with... beliefs about
religion either by coercion or by persuasion."4 As Stephen Monsma points
out, "Formal neutrality asks whether or not religion is being singled out in law
as a category for either special benefits or burdens. Substantive neutrality, in
contrast, focuses not on the form government actions take, but on the effects
or consequences of government actions." '9

45. Abington, 374 U.S. at 222 (stating that the Establishment Clause requires state
neutrality toward religion); see Phillip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,

29 U. Ci. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961) (defining formal neutrality); Douglas Laycock, Formal
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-

1001 (1990) (analyzing Kurland, supra); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 (stating that the Free
Exercise Clause protects against laws that "discriminateO against some or all religious beliefs
or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons"); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,877 (1990) (maintaining that government may not "impose special
disabilities" based on religious views or status); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982)
(stating that the clearest requirement of the religion clauses is that no denomination should be
favored or preferred over others); cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (commenting that endorsement of religion is invalid because it "sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders ... [to] the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community").
Formal neutrality has received much criticism. One major criticism is that, when applied to the
free exercise claims of adherents of minority religions, it leaves their religious exercise
unprotected as long as the government action is neutral and applicable to the public at large.
See Stephen V. Monsma, Substantive Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No
Establishment Common Ground, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 13, 24-25 (2000).

46. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23,845-46
(1995) (holding that the exclusion of a religious student publication from financial assistance
available to other student publications violates the value of neutrality and places an
unconstitutional burden on religious students' religious exercise).
47.

EVANS, supra note 30, at 218.

48.

Laycock, supra note 45, at 1001-02 (footnote omitted).

49.

Monsma, supra note 45, at 27; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562-63 (Souter, J.,

concurring in part and concurring injudgment).
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The current Court has opted to embrace formal neutrality as the
constitutional standard in free exercise cases." In practice, the formal
standard permits the state to burden the exercise of religion so long as the
burdening is not the object of the state action, but rather only an "incidental
effect" of the governmental action."' Thus, under formal neutrality, no
violation of an adherent's free exercise occurs "even when [the laws] prohibit
religious exercise in application.""2
Finally, the Free Exercise Clause is an individual right, protecting the
value of freedom of belief or conscience." Sandel has noted that "[i]n
affirming a notion of respect for persons, it recalls the ideal of freedom of
conscience. By emphasizing the individual's right to choose his beliefs, it
points beyond religion to... 'the rights of privacy and personhood. '"' 4 As
Justice Stevens argued in Wallace v. Jaffree,"

50. The Court seems to use substantive neutrality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Examples can be found in the school prayer cases. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffiree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (striking down a statute allowing a moment of silence in public schools because
legislative history showed an intent to return prayer to public schools); cf Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 840-42 (recognizing that the government program at issue was neutral toward religion);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,625-27 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (stating that the "endorsement test" in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence holds that agovernment endorsement ofreligion is unconstitutional if such action
makes a person feel like a political outsider because of her choice to follow adifferent religion
or no religion). But see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997) (overturning
injunction barring public school teachers from providing remedial education on property of
religious school). Agostini represents ashift in the Establishment Clause jurisprudence toward
formal neutrality. The Court no longer presumes that the presence of public employees in
religious schools indicates state support of religion or the public subsidization of religious
education. Id. at 234; Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770
(1995) (endorsing, in the context of public forum regulation, a formal neutrality rule and
asserting that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it... is...
open to all on equal terms").
51. An incidental burden or effect occurs when the state action has a secular purpose but
nevertheless negatively impacts a religious belief or practice. For an analysis of the different
types of incidental effects, see Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural
Overview and an Appraisal ofRecent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943 (1986).
52. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562-63 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)).
53. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("The Free Exercise Clause
categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs
as such." (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402 (1963))); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that free exercise is an individual right).

54. Sandel,supra note 35, at 87 (quoting LAJRENCEH.TRBE,
§ 14-13, at 885 (1978)).

AMEmCANCONSTrUrTONAL

LAW

55.

472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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[T]he individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This
conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the
individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that
religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful.. ..

Traditionally, freedom of belief has been protected by protecting the
believer from governmental discrimination and coercion-for example, by
prohibiting the government from requiring believers to choose between their
livelihood and their religious beliefs." In addition, the emphasis on antidiscrimination and non-coercion has led the Court to deny recognition of
claims in which government action neither coerced believers "into violating
their religious beliefs[] nor... penalize[d] religious activity by denying any
person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens."58 Penalties in this context are coercive; they encourage believers to
act against their beliefs in order to receive the benefits of citizenship. They
are discriminatory if they deny believers an equal share of governmental
benefits or liberties. Hence, the emphasis in protecting the freedom of belief,
like the emphasis on neutrality, is the protection of the believer from state
coercion and discrimination.59

56. Id.at 53 (holding that the purpose of a moment of silence statute was to restore prayer
in public schools, and that the statute violated the First Amendment value of government
neutrality toward religion) (footnotes omitted). Many religious scholars have noted that the
emphasis on freedom of choice and autonomy found in the arguments surrounding the
importance of the freedom of belief misunderstands the role of religion in the life of believers.
Professor Bette Novit Evans has noted that
[e]mphasis on individual choice fails to capture the communal aspects of religion; at best,
the strong individualism of this view implies a particular view of a religion. Classical
liberalism developed in a protestant world that emphasized individual spiritual
responsibility and understood a church as a voluntary association, an understanding that
is foreign to traditional Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam, at the very least. Consequently,
this account does adequately protect religious institutions-particularly ones that do not
themselves foster choice. Strongly collective or strongly hierarchical religions would not
fare well under this interpretation.
EVANS, supra note 30, at 20; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 36 (1993) (stating that
emphasis on choice misunderstands the role of religion and religious institutions in the lives of
religious adherents).
57. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. The reader may also find it helpful to read
unemployment compensation cases that follow Sherbert. See also id. at 412 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhe Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government can not
do to the individual .... ").
58. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,449 (1988).
59. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text; see also Jimmy Swaggert Ministries
v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990) (holding that the religious conscience of
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Furthermore, the freedom of belief is necessarily two-fold. It must
reasonably include the freedom to act in accordance with one's beliefs, not
only to hold them. This means that while religious conduct is also protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, conduct motivated by religious belief differs
from religious belief or religious speech. For example, religiously motivated
conduct may cause physical harm to others, but arguably speech does not.6 °
Therefore, while religious belief and speech are fully protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, religiously motivated conduct is not. As the Court in
Cantwell v. Connecticut stated in its oft-quoted dictum:
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the

second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection
of society.... In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected

freedom.6

As a result, state and federal courts have consistently found that religiously
motivated conduct that inflicts harms on others is not protected by the free
exercise doctrine.62

adherents is not violated by collecting or paying sales tax on religious materials); Lyng, 485
U.S. at 452-53 (finding no free exercise violation when the government uses land sacred to the
Native Americans because the government action did not require members ofNative American
Church to violate their religious beliefs); cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577-78 (1992)
(stating that non-coercion is a minimum requirement of the Establishment Clause).
60. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160-61, 171 (944) (finding no
equal protection problem despite a guardian's religious motivations, in denying children the
right to distribute religious literature in the streets in contravention of state's child labor laws,
which were designed to protect children from physical harm).
61. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (footnote omitted); see also
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(stating that the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious beliefs and conduct;
hence, religiously motivated conduct must be presumptively protected by the Free Exercise
Clause and religious exercise often "requires the performance of (or abstention from) certain
acts").
62. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-81, 605 (1983)
(upholding Internal Revenue Service's withdrawal of tax-exempt status because the school
practiced racial discrimination in admissions and in certain school policies, even though
segregation was religiously motivated; racial discrimination harms others); Smith v. Fair
Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912, 918 (Cal. 1996) (forbidding religiously
motivated discrimination against unmarried couples by religious landlords); State v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99, 114 (Tenn. 1975) (forbidding handling of live poisonous snakes even if for religious
reasons).
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Nevertheless, while the state may regulate religiously motivated conduct,
the Court in Cantwell was clear that it may do so only to protect society. The
state regulation must be narrowly tailored so as not to suppress the free
exercise of religion or unduly censor religious activity. For example, in
Cantwell, the state's criminal law required that any person soliciting money,
services, or subscriptions for a charitable or religious cause, must be approved
by the state to ensure that the "cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object
of charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency
and integrity." '3 Although the Court suggested that the state might regulate
the time, place, and manner of Cantwell's street solicitation in order to
safeguard the peace without unduly infringing on his right to free exercise,"
the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it censored the
appellant's religious beliefs.65
B. ConstitutionallyMandatedAccommodations: Exemptionsfor
Religiously Motivated Conduct'
1. The Importance of Exemptions for Religiously Motivated Conduct
Much debate surrounds the constitutional importance ofaccommodations
for religious belief. Nevertheless, the most compelling justification for
requiring accommodations is that they protect religious minorities from
discrimination and threats to religious freedom.67 As many scholars have
63. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6294, amended by § 860d
(Supp. 1937)).
64. Id. at 304.
65. Id. at 305.
66. In this Article, I use both exemptions and accommodations interchangeably to refer
to those actions that are required by the Constitution. In the legal literature, the words
"accommodation" and "exemption" are sometimes used to signify different governmental
actions. For example, Professor Ira Lupu uses "accommodation" to refer to only those
exemptions that are voluntarily granted by the state or that are discretionary and "exemption"
for those that are constitutionally mandated. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructingthe Establishment
Clause: The CaseAgainst DiscretionaryAccommodation ofReligion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555,
559 (1991) [hereinafter, Lupu, Reconstructing];Ira C. Lupu, Where RightsBegin: TheProblem
of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 948-53 (1989)
[hereinafter Lupu, Where Rights Begin]. On the other hand, Professor Michael W. McConnell
uses "accommodation" to refer to both those actions that the state grants voluntarily and those
that are constitutionally mandated. Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 686 (1992) [hereinafter
McConnell, Accommodation].
67. Stephen Carter understands the primary importance of exemptions in a slightly
different manner. Carter asserts,
The strongest argument in favor of accommodation of religion is the preservation of
genuine diversity- not simply people who look different, but people who in deep ways are
different. ...
The accommodationist believes in religion as something that actuallychanges
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noted, exemption claims come almost exclusively from members of minority
religious groups. The concerns of majority religious groups are more likely
to be addressed in the legislative process, and as a result, their members have
little need to resort to the judiciary for relief6 " As a result, accommodations
are "particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the
inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and
indifference, as well as overt hostility."6 9 Accommodations "guarantee
'fairness' to religious minorities when the political process fails," by ensuring
that they are not "unduly harmed" or the subject of discrimination.70

the way people are; nurturing religion, then, also nurtures a plurality of communities,
communities that assign to existence meanings different from those of the dominant
culture.
Stephen L. Carter, Beyond Neutrality, THE CHIUSTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 11, 2000, at 996.
Michael McConnell argues that four additional justifications for accommodations exist:
(1) accommodation "is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment"; (2)
accommodation "best achieves the [underlying] purposes of the First Amendment,... that the
freedom to carry out one's duties to God is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace
of the legislature"; (3) accommodation best effectuates the original intent of the Constitution;
and (4) "[i]n the absence of accommodations or exemptions, many otherwise beneficial laws
would interfere severely with religious freedom." McConnell, Accommodation,supra note 66,
at 690-94 (footnotes omitted).
68. As Professor Kathleen Sullivan argues,
Note that not a single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from
a mainstream Christian religious practitioner. Mainstream Christianity does not need
judicial help; the legislature is likely already to be obliging. It did not take a lawsuit but
only a statute to free sacramental wine from the strictures of Prohibition. Claims for
judicial exemption under the Free Exercise Clause, live claims for exemption under the
Free Speech Clause, emanate almost invariably from members of relatively politically
powerless groups, toward whom the majority is likely to be selectively indifferent or
worse.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 216 (1992)
(footnote omitted); see also CARTER, supra note 56, at 128 (arguing that the political process
protects mainstream religious groups but "not the many smaller groups that exist at the
margins"); EVANS, supra note 30, at 206 ("Religious interest groups with sufficient political
power may be successful in having accommodation written into legislation or administrative
regulations.").
69.

McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 66, at 693; see also EvANS, supra note 30,

at 218 ("the very point of making religious freedom a constitutional right is to protect those
whose interests will not be reflected in majority decisions"); McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism, supra note 40, at 1148 ("The degree of protection for religious minorities should
be no less than that which our society would provide for the majority.").
70. McConnell, Accommodation,supra note 66, at 728; see also Lawrence C. Sager, The
FreeExercise of Culture: Some Doubts andDistinctions, 129 DAEDALUS 193 (2000) (stating
that the Constitution protects minority faiths "from discrimination bred or hostility or
indifference to which such faiths are notoriously vulnerable").
However, several scholars have taken the position that accommodations are not only
problematic, but unconstitutional as they conflict with the Establishment Clause by favoring
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Furthermore, it is the role of the Court to act as a counter-majoritarian
institution in order to ensure that the rights of minorities are protected. The
Court maintains this role in the context of the First Amendment. As Dean
Jesse Choper notes,
[T]he dominant theme (the "major premise") of both Religion Clauses is to
protect religious liberty and the integrity of individual conscience, and that
judicial enforcement ofthese provisions should be confined to securing those
freedoms. Since the essential function of judicial review.., is to protect
personal liberty, especially for minorities who do not receive vigorous
representation in the political process, and since the most frequent threats to
religious freedom will be made against groups outside the mainstream, I
propose an energetic role for the Court in this area."
Consequently, exemptions of religious believers from laws of general
applicability are in some instances essential for the preservation of religious
freedom, and it is the Court's duty, as a counter-majoritarian institution, to
ensure this preservation.
2. The Compelling State Interest Test
Because of the constitutional importance of free exercise articulated in
Cantwell,by 1963 the Court began to use the compelling state interest test to
determine whether the state's regulation or burden on religiously motivated

religion over non-religion. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering
the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U.
PITT. L. REv. 75, 77 (1990) (arguing that the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from
advancing religion in any way, thereby precluding free exercise accommodations); Kurland,
supra note 45, at 96; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging PrincipleofAccommodation of Religion
(Dubitante),76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1691 (1988) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not
permit free exercise accommodations); cf Gey, supra, at 76 (arguing that accommodations are
forbidden as "enacting into law the religious preferences of the political majority"); Lupu,
Reconstructing, supra note 66, at 587, 611 (arguing that discretionary legislative
accommodations are forbidden by the Constitution because they constitute favoritism for the
majority); William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith andFree Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Co.
L. REv. 308, 320 (1991) (arguing that accommodations constitute "favoritism for religious
belief over other beliefs"); Ellis West, The CaseAgainsta Right to Religion-BasedExemptions,
4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETtiCS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 600 (1990) (arguing that accommodation
constitutes favoritism, which violates the principle of neutrality).
It has also been asserted that accommodations are unconstitutional because they act as
a subsidy for religion. See Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":
Kurland Revisited, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 373, 377. Accommodations are also unconstitutional
because they act as special treatment; they particularly egregious when the burden of the
accommodation is shifted from the adherent to non-adherents. Gey, supra, at 85.
71. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 9 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
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conduct was constitutionally permitted.72 Later, in Employment Division v.
Smith, Justice O'Connor justified the use of this stringent inquiry:
The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred
position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty,
whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling
governmental interests "of the highest order."73
When the state was unable to demonstrate a compelling state interest, the
Court required the state to accommodate the believer's exercise of religion by
exempting the believer from the burdensome law or regulation. The purpose
of the exemption was to remove the burden from the believer of having to
choose between the believer's obligation to obey the laws of faith and the
believer's obligation to obey the law of the state.
In the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner,74 the Court, using the compelling
state interest test, required for the first time that a state exempt a citizen from
a generally applicable law on the basis of the citizen's religious beliefs. In
Sherbert, the Seventh-Day Adventist appellant was discharged from her job
because she refused to work on Saturday, her faith's Sabbath." This religious
practice prevented her from obtaining other employment, and she was denied
unemployment compensation, on the same account.76 The Supreme Court
considered two questions.
First, the Court inquired "whether the
disqualification for benefits impose[d] any [significant] burden on the
[appellant's] free exercise" ofher beliefs."' On that initial question, the Court
held that the disqualification for benefits imposed an impermissible burden on
Mrs. Sherbert's free exercise of her religion, even if such burden was
"incidental" or unintended.78 The Court stated,
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant
for her Saturday worship.79

72. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id. at 399-401.
77. Id. at 403.
78. Id. at 404.
79. Id.
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The Court's second question concerned whether the state could meet the
required level of judicial scrutiny. The Court considered "whether some
compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South
Carolina statute justifie[d] the substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right."8 The Court held that the state's asserted interest,
preventing the filing of fraudulent claims, was not compelling.8 Additionally,
the Court stated that even if the state had made the requisite showing of a
compelling state interest, it would nevertheless need to demonstrate that no
lesser restrictive means were available to achieve its goals. 2 Hence, the Court
ruled that South Carolina was constitutionally required to exempt Mrs.
Sherbert from any Saturday work requirements under the state's
unemployment compensation statute. 3 The state was constitutionally required
to accommodate an adherent's exercise of her religious beliefs even when that
exercise conflicts with a law of general applicability, unless restricting the
adherent's free exercise is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, opined that the exemption of Mrs.
Sherbert from the statute at issue "reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." 4
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Court repeatedly affirmed the test
articulated by the Court in Sherbert. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 5 a
case involving a compulsory school attendance law, the Court held that, as
applied to the Amish, the law created an unconstitutional burden on the
community's religious exercise with no corresponding compelling state
interest.8 6 The statute at issue required school attendance until the age of
sixteen. 7 The appellants, members of an Amish community, argued that
higher education, which is education beyond eighth grade, would expose
Amish children to "'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs," and
"interpose[] a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the
Amish religious community."8 8 The state asserted the importance of
mandatory education and the role that it plays in the production of effective
and self-reliant citizens.8 9 While acknowledging the importance of the state
interest, the Court held that, in this instance, the state interest was not
compelling and the burden on the appellants' religious exercise was

80. Id. at 406.
81. Id.
at 407.
82. Id.
83. Id.at 409.
84. Id.

85.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

228-29.
207.
211-12.
224.
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significant.9 ° The statute compelled the appellants to expose their children to
secular influences that are contrary to Amish beliefs, and such exposure would
undermine the children's commitment to the community.9 The Court
reasoned that
[i]ndeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, asparenspatriae,
to "save" a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an
additional two years of compulsory formal high school education, the State
will in large measure influence, if not determine, the religious future of the
child.92
Moreover, the Court opined that the state's legitimate interest in education
was not compelling when applied to the Amish community because the Amish
had a long history of producing self-reliant and productive citizens."' In
addition, the Amish rejected public assistance; therefore, their children would
not become public charges.94
In 1981, in Thomas v. Review Board," the Court again used the
compelling state interest test to exempt a Jehovah's Witness from a state's
statutory unemployment compensation requirements. In Thomas, the state
agency refused to interpret the appellant's unwillingness to manufacture war
materials because of his religious beliefs as a disavowal of work for "good
cause," as was required in order to receive benefits." The Court found that
the state statute significantly burdened the appellant's religious exercise and
that the state did not show any compelling interest justifying the burden it
created for the appellant.9 7
3. Disappearing Acts: The Current Supreme Court Approach to
Constitutionally Required Accommodations
During the 1980s, while the Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of the
strict scrutiny test for free exercise claims on the one hand, on the other, it

90.

Id. at 218, 228-29.

91.

Id. at211-12.

92. Id. at 232.
93. Id. at 235.
94. Id.at 222.
95.

450 U.S. 707 (1981).

96. Id.at 712.
97. Id. at 719; see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(finding no compelling state interest tojustify denying unemployment benefits to Christian who
refused to work on Sunday); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144
(1987) (denying state argument that a less demanding standard should apply when the law is
neutral and generally applicable, and reaffirming the applicability of strict scrutiny in free
exercise cases).
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rejected the vast majority of free exercise claims that came before it."' In
rejecting these claims, the Court employed one of two methods: either the
Court applied the compelling state interest test but found that the state had
demonstrated an interest sufficient to override the free exercise claim; or the
Court held that the burden complained of was constitutionally insignificant,
making the use of the strict scrutiny test inappropriate. 99
One of the clearest examples of the Court's first restrictive maneuver can
be found in UnitedStates v. Lee.'" In Lee, the Court upheld the state's refusal
to exempt an Amish employer from paying social security taxes on his Amish
employees' wages even though the Amish objected to the payments on
religious grounds.'"' The Amish appellant asserted that the religious beliefs
of the Amish mandated that they care for the needy of their community,
prohibiting them from accepting social security benefits as well as from
making contributions to the social security system."° Applying the strict
scrutiny test, the Court held that the government's interest in a fiscally sound
social security system was "overriding."'0 3 The Court also held that
compelling the exemption requested, or any exemption from the social
security system, would require other exemptions from the tax statutes, which
would inevitably threaten the fiscal integrity of our system of taxation. '04The
Court reasoned:
If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt
from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not
function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because
tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.' 5
98. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (asserting that the Court
has never applied the compelling state interest test to invalidate a generally applicable law
outside of the employment context); see also Sullivan, supra note 68, at 215 (making a similar
observation).
99. Sullivan also makes this point. See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 215; see also
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Ci. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994)
(explaining that the compelling interest test prior to Smith was "strict in theory but feeble in
fact").
100. 455 U.S. 252 (1982); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604
(1983) (holding that the government's "interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education" is a compelling state interest outweighing the burden imposed on religious exercise).
101. Lee,455 U.S. at 261.
102. Id. at 255.
103. Id. at 257-59.
104. Id. at 258. Choper makes a similar point. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of
Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV.1709, 1725 (2000) ("[Ihe Court felt that accommodating

the Amish belief would be too administratively complex and actuarially dangerous.").
105.

Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. In 1986, the Court rejected an income tax exemption petition
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The Court's decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association'° 6 represents its second restrictive maneuver, rejecting free
exercise claims by finding that the burden to the complainant's religious
exercise, although in some cases "devastating," is constitutionally
insignificant." 7 Lyng involved a struggle by several tribes and individuals
against a Forest Service plan to permit timber harvesting and road
construction in an area of the National Forest that traditionally had "been used
for religious purposes by members of three American Indian tribes."' 8
Although the Court acknowledged that the area of the proposed governmental
activity was "significant as an integral and indispensable part of Indian
religious conceptualization and practice," and that construction "would cause

serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and
necessary part of the belief systems,"' 9 the Court nevertheless held that the
claim did not merit a strict scrutiny review. " Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, focused her inquiry on whether the government's action was
coercive, as only government activity that "coerce[s] individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs," demands strict scrutiny."' Under this
analysis, the constitutional mandate that the government not "prohibit" free
exercise of religion means only that the government cannot coerce religious
belief or coerce behavior that is contrary to religious belief without a
compelling state interest. This understanding of coercion excludes the
possibility that the Free Exercise Clause requires any affirmative
responsibility on the part of the state to ensure the freedom of religious
exercise." 2 The Court, quoting Justice Douglas's concurrence in Sherbert,
maintained that "[t]he crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit':
on similar grounds. In Hernandez v. Commissioner,a member of the Church of Scientology
claimed that the IRS's refusal to grant an income tax exemption for certain contributions to the
church impermissibly burdened his religious exercise. 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989). The Court
held that the alleged burden was "justified by the 'broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."' Id.
at 699-700 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260).
106. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
107. Id. at451.
108. Id. at441-42.
109. Id. at 442 (quoting a 1979 study commissioned by the Forest Service concerning the
proposed government action).
110. Id. at453.
11I. Id. at 450; see also id. at 449. Justice O'Connor emphasizes this focus again in her
concurrence in Employment Division v. Smith. Justice O'Connor argued,
In my view, however, the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden
imposed by government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the burden is imposed
directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious practices, or indirectly
through laws that, in effect, make abandonment ofone's own religion or conformity to the
religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil community.
494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 218.

HeinOnline -- 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 2001-2002

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:563

'For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from
the government.'""13
Because the government did not force the complainants in Lyng to violate
their religious beliefs by mandating forbidden conduct or by forbidding
conduct mandated by their faith, the Court held that the burden on their
religious exercise was constitutionally insignificant. "4 The government action
in Lyng was not coercive; it was simply of a different character and, as such,
not protected by the Free Exercise Clause." 5
Furthermore, the Court held that the character of the claim in Lyng
differed significantly from the claims in most other free exercise cases. In
challenging how the government would use its own property, Lyng challenged
the conduct of the government's internal affairs. As the Court in Lyng
maintained, "The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.""' 6
The Court also rejected the free exercise claim in Lyng because of the
nature of the remedy sought. That remedy was much more expansive than the
remedies sought in the cases in which the compelling state interest test
previously had been applied. 117 In those cases, the remedies sought were
exemptions from complying with laws of general applicability. "' In Lyng, the
remedy sought was to require the state to abandon one of its programs." 9 The
113. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring)). Professor McConnell argues that the "prohibit" language of the
clause can also be interpreted more broadly "as applying also to disadvantageous treatment in
the allocation of government 'benefits'... necessary to preserve the conditions of personal
liberty under the circumstances of the welfare-regulatory state." McConnell, Accommodation,
supra note 66, at 690; see also CARTER, supra note 56, at 143-45.
114. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
115. Id.at449-51.
116. Id. at 448 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)). In Bowen, the
Court rejected the free exercise claim made by a Native American father seeking government
welfare benefits for his daughter without the assignment of a Social Security number in
contravention of the statute. Id. at 695. He believed that the assignment of a Social Security
number would rob his daughter of her soul. Id. at 696. The Court held that religious believers
have no "right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." Id. at 700. As
a result, the burden imposed by the government was constitutionally insignificant. Id. at 701;
see also O' Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (using the rational relation test
to conclude that prison security procedures, which made impossible certain observances of
Muslim prisoners, were not unconstitutional burdens on religious exercise); Goldman v.
Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (rejecting free exercise claim of Jewish Air Force
officer who sought exemption from military regulation prohibiting the wearing of yarmulkes).
117. Lyng, 485 U.S. at454-55.
118. See Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of
Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REv. 651, 669 (1991).
119. Lyng, 485 U.S. at454-55.
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Court held that this fundamental difference takes the complaint outside of free
exercise protection. 2 0 As Jesse Choper maintains,
Although the matter is not uncomplicated, there is much to be said for the
Court's view that, rather than weighing the effect on the government's
interest of granting an exemption for a given free exercise claim in the
balance, those claims seeking a remedy that would require the government
to abandon its program entirely should be structurally distinguished and the
free exercise exemption ordinarily denied.'
By considering these claims as outside the margins of free exercise protection
and by failing to recognize a cognizable religious injury in Lyng and related
cases, the Court enfeebles the claims of political outsiders to have their
religious exercise protected.'
Notwithstanding the aforementioned exceptions, the Court reaffirmed the
appropriateness of the strict scrutiny test in the context of religious conduct
and laws of general applicability as late as 1989.123 Despite the long tenure
of the compelling state interest test in this area, the Court in Employment
Division v. Smith'24 abandoned the test. In Smith, the State of Oregon denied
unemployment benefits to two drug rehabilitation counselors who were fired
from their jobs at a private rehabilitation center.'2 5 The employees, Alfred
Smith and Galen Black, members of the Native American Church, were fired
for violating the conditions of their employment "because they ingested
peyote for sacramental purposes at a [church] ceremony."' 26 The state statute
prohibited the use of peyote, with no legislative exemption for sacramental
use.' The state unemployment compensation agency denied Smith's and
Black's applications for unemployment benefits, determining that they were
"ineligible for benefits
because they had been discharged for work-related
28
'misconduct.""11

The state court of appeals reversed the agency's

determination of ineligibility, holding that the denial of benefits constituted

120. Id. at 452.
121. Choper, supra note 118, at 670 (footnote omitted). But see David C. Williams &
Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 906-10

(1991).
122. See CARTER, supra note 56, at 131-32.
123. Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (requiring that
unemployment benefits be paid, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, to Christian worker who
refused work on Sunday, his Sabbath, even though he was not a member of any congregation
or denoination).
124.

125.
126.
127.
(1988)).
128.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80-021(3)(s)
Id.
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a violation of the employees' religious exercise under the First Amendment.' 29
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision. 3
Justice Scalia, in this highly criticized opinion,' 3 ' asserted "that the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)."" 3 Hence the Court held that despite prior Supreme Court cases,
exemptions from neutral laws of generally applicability are almost never
required under the Constitution.'3 3 The Court stated,
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public
policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development." To make an individual's
obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting
him, byvirtue of his beliefs, "to become a law3 unto
himself,"---contradicts both
4
constitutional tradition and common sense.
As a result of this reasoning, the Court maintained that the compelling state
interest test is, under these conditions, inappropriate for claims of this type.
The Court asserted that "[a]ny society adopting such a system would be
courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
suppress none of them.' 31 5 Hence, protecting the government, and the courts,
from the perceived potential disaster of a multitude of free exercise claims
takes precedence over the Court's role as a counter-majoritarian institution,
a role that protects the rights of minorities who have little power in the
129. Id.; see also Smith v. Employment Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Black v.
Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
130. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875; see Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Or.
1986). Although the state argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because the

ingestion of peyote was criminal under Oregon law, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the
state's argument. Smith, 494 U.S. at 450. The Oregon Supreme Court asserted that the purpose
of the "misconduct" provision of the unemployment compensation statute was to maintain the
financial integrity of the compensation fund, not to enforce the state's criminal law. Id.As
such, the purpose of the statute was insufficient to justify the substantial burden that
disqualification imposed. Id.
131. See, e.g.,CARTER, supranote 56, at 127; Choper, supranote 51, at 672-77; Laycock,
Remnants, supra note 40, at 1-3; McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 40;
Sullivan, supra note 68, at 216.
132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
133. Id. at 884.

134. Id. (citations omitted).
135.

Id. at 888.
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political arena. As Professor Stephen Carter asserts,
It is as though the relevant legal principles have been designed in order to
uphold state regulations infringing on faith traditions that lie far from the
mainstream; perhaps the courts are unable to appreciate the concern about
"incidental" infringements precisely because judges are not drawn from
religious traditions likely to suffer them. 36
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia asserted that minority disenfranchisement is
simply an acceptable cost of democracy."" He concluded,
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself
or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs. 38
Notwithstanding the strictures placed by the Smith Court on challenges to
laws of general applicability that burden religious exercise, three types of free
exercise claims seem to have escaped Smith's grasp: burdens that result from
non-neutral laws or laws that are not generally applicable; 39 hybrid claims,
in which petitioners assert other constitutional violations as well as a free
exercise violation;' and when, as in the unemployment benefits cases, the

136. CARTER, supra note 56, at 128.
137. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
138. Id. Stephen Carter argues that Justice Scalia fails to grasp the essential message of

the Free Exercise Clause. Carter states,
What Justice Scalia misses isthat itwas inorder to avoid this "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government" that the Free Exercise Clause was crafted in the first place.
The fact that the defense of religious liberty burdens the courts is hardly a reason, as he
implies it is, to forbear.
CARTER, supra note 56, at 129; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rise and Fall of the
Religion Clauses, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 499, 505-06 (1992) (stating that Smith causes the free

exercise of religious minorities to "be wholly dependent upon the goodwill of political
majorities"); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 216 (noting "big flaw in Smith: it entrenches patterns
of de facto discrimination against minority religions").
139.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (stating that "government may not . . . impose special

disabilities on" religion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32 (1993).
140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. But see Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (calling the distinctions drawn in Smith "ultimately
untenable"); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 702-07 (9th Cir.
1999), opinion withdrawn, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (outlining approaches to
hybrid claim cases and criticism); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(opining that hybrid rights category "is completely illogical").
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context of the government action "len[ds] itself to [an] individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,"'' or "where
the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that
system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
142
reason."'
In addition, for all that Smith restricts, still remaining is the Court's
acknowledgment of the underlying value of non-coercion. The Constitution
continues to prohibit, although arguably in more limited circumstances, state
action that mandates religiously forbidden conduct or forbids religiously
mandated conduct. 43 Part IV of this Article focuses on state action mandating
religiously forbidden conduct and the claims of pregnant women of minority
faiths who seek to avoid state-coerced medical treatment.
1H. MEDICAL TREATMENT, RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS, AND
THE STATE'S USE OF FORCE

In addition to the right to act in religiously motivated ways, pregnant
women who refuse consent to medical treatment should also be protected by
the common law and constitutional right to refuse such treatment. Legal
rationales offered by courts that compel treatment not only ignore women's
free exercise claims, but also discount the right to refuse treatment. This Part
explores the following issues: the contours of the right to refuse medical
treatment, the legal rationales used by courts compelling treatment, and the
Professor McConnell notes that Smith itself can be understood as a hybrid case.
McConnell asserts that "Smith and Black could have made a colorable claim under the Free
Speech Clause that the prohibition of peyote use interfered with their ability to communicate
this message. If burning a flag is speech because it communicates a political belief, ingestion
of peyote is no less." McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 40, at 1122 (footnote
omitted). McConnell further asserts that this is proof"that the Smith Court's notion of'hybrid'
claims was not intended to be taken seriously." Id.
141. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism for
individualized exemptions."). As stated in the following, Professor McConnell is also
suspicious of the Court's reasoning on this issue.
Even more strikingly, the "individual governmental assessment" distinction cannot
explain the result in Smith itself. If Smith is viewed as an unemployment compensation
case, the distinction is obviously spurious. If Smith is viewed as a hypothetical criminal
prosecution for peyote use, there would be an individual governmental assessment of the
defendants' motives and actions in the form of a criminal trial.
The purported distinction thus has no obvious connection to either the circumstance of
Smith or to the Court's precedents.... [I]t appears to have one function only: to enable
the Court to reach the conclusion it desired in Smith without openly overruling any prior
decisions.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 40, at 1124.
142. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
143. See id. at 883 (leaving intact the non-coercion language found in the unemployment
compensation cases).
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factual contexts in which pregnant women refuse treatment and judges compel
treatment. Although the Supreme Court has held that "religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection,"'" in the end, judicially compelled
treatment demonstrates that courts are loathe to acknowledge or protect the
religiously motivated behavior of those who belong to religious groups outside
of the mainstream. Perhaps in these cases, the judiciary-particularly the trial
court-chooses to uphold the court's own religious values over those its
members do not Value or comprehend.' 45 Ethicists Nancy Dubler and David
Nimmons make a similar point with respect to courts' refusals to allow
parents to refuse lifesaving medical care for their children. They write,
Lurking in this choice is the bias of a secular society that values the body over
the spirit. If courts and bioethics'scholars really believed that the child's soul
existed independently after death and would be condemned to eternal
damnation, they might not order blood transfusions over the objections of
parents ....
But in our secular society, judges have unanimously agreed to rank
the danger of eternal danmation below the possibility of death.'"
Nevertheless, bioethicists have ranked the importance of informed consent
and the voluntariness of consent as core ethical values. These values protect
patients from the undue influence of the physician's personal values and
preferences regarding treatment. 47 As the right to refuse medical treatment
is one of our central moral beliefs, bioethics requires physicians to respect a
patient's right to control her own life and, as such, prohibits physicians48 from
performing surgical interventions without the consent of the patient.,
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The common law has recognized the right of individuals to refuse medical
treatment since at least 1914. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York

144. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
145. Compelling medical treatment for the sake of the fetus in the face of the pregnant
woman's religious objection may also reflect the court's conviction that the woman is a bad
mother; the stereotype of a good mother is one that always puts the needs for her children first.
See Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, The Content of Mother Stereotypes, 32 SEX

ROLES 495,507-08 (1995) (defining the stereotype of the good mother: she is married, and she
puts her children first). Professor Lisa Ikemoto also makes this suggestion, noting that courts
in these cases consider the woman's refusal to consent to treatment on behalf of her fetus as a
sign that she is an inappropriate mother because she "choose[s] religious principle over maternal
altruism." Ikemoto, supra note 17, at 511.
146. NANCY DUBLER & DAVID NIMMONS, ETHICS ON CALL 272 (1992).
147. J. Steven Svoboda et al., Informed Consentfor Neonatal Circumcision: An Ethical
and Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.& POL'Y 61, 71-72 (2000).
148.

ld. at 65.
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Hospital,49 Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, held that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body."' 50 This right is a component of the common law
right to bodily integrity and self-determination and is maintained in large part
through the doctrine of informed consent, which prohibits physicians from
performing any medical procedure on a patient without explaining all relevant
information and obtaining the patient's consent.' 5' Failure to obtain informed
consent results in a cause of action for battery'5 2 and may also result in an
action for medical malpractice.'
Furthermore, the right to refuse medical treatment is a constitutional right
encompassed within the right to privacy and self-determination found in the
penumbras of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 54 The Supreme Court's decision
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health'55 illustrates this
position. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the right
to refuse medical treatment was a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

149. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
150. Id. at 93; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,764-65 (1985) (holding that surgery
on a robbery suspect without his consent "would be an extensive intrusion on [his] personal
privacy and bodily integrity"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985) ("The right of
a person to control his own body is a basic societal concept, long recognized in the common law
.... "). This right has been extended to non-competent persons as well. See, e.g.,
Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31,435 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
151. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990) ("This notion of
bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally
required for medical treatment."). However, evidence exists that physicians no longer believe
in the value of informed consent; rather, "patients' choices are respected only if the doctors
think the choice is the best decision. If the physician disagrees with the wisdom of the patient's
choice then it is likely the patient's decision will be overridden." Leslie G.Espinoza, Dissecting
Women, Dissecting Law: The Court-Orderingof Caesarean Section Operations and the
FailureofInformed Consent to Protect Women ofColor, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 211,231 (1994)
(citing David Orentlicher, The Illusion ofPatient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA
2101,2101 (1991)).
152. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that physicians

who perform non-consensual surgery may be guilty of battery); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d
553, 561 (Minn. 1995) (stating that battery can be used against a doctor who withholds a
material aspect of a medical procedure); see Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; James J. Nocon,
PhysiciansandMaternal-FetalConflicts: Duties, Rights andResponsibilities,5 J.L. & HEALTH
1, 7-8 (1990-91); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 9 (5th ed. 1984) (defining battery).
153. Nocon, supra note 152, at 6-7.
154. Quinlan, 355 A.2dat663. Several commentators have asserted that the right to refuse
medical treatment is also based in the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizures, which has been interpreted to implicitly embody a right to privacy. See,
e.g., Arch, supranote 5, at 644-45; Gallagher, supra note 5, at 21.
155. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Amendment.'56 He reasoned that "[t]he principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from [the Court's] prior decisions."'5 The Court
also opined "that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as
an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment."' 58 Moreover, the
United States government, when represented by both former Solicitors
General Charles Fried in Webster v. Reproductive Services and Kenneth Star
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, acknowledged that coercive medical surgical
treatment on a pregnant woman, such as a forced abortion, would violate the
pregnant woman's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. 9
Even though the right to refuse medical treatment is an important common
law and constitutional right, it is by no means absolute. Traditionally, it can
be outweighed by four countervailing state interests: 60 (1) "the preservation
of life";' 6' (2) "the prevention of suicide";' 6 2 (3) "the ethical integrity of the

156. Id.at 278.
157. Id.; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (discussing that the "Due Process Clause specially
protects... fundamental rights and liberties").
158. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argued that the

Constitution supports a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment "[b]ecause our notions of
liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the
Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Professor Sheldon Gelman argues that "limb, health, and indolency of the body" are
part and parcel of the historical meaning of the constitutional right to life. He further asserts
that had the Court acknowledged the historic meaning of "life," the outcome of Cruzan may
have changed "by adding weight to the individual's interest or triggering strict scrutiny of the
state's measures. The right of refusing medical treatment would have had more 'cognizable
roots in the Constitution."' Sheldon Gelman, "Life " and "Liberty": Their OriginalMeaning,
HistoricalAntecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate OverAbortion Rights, 78 MINN.
L. REv. 585, 697 (1994).
159.

Transcript ofArguments Before the Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,

1989, at B 12 (containing transcript of arguments for Webster v. Reproductive Services); Brief

of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Respondents In No. 88-1125 And
Supporting Petitioners in No. 88-1309, quoted in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 428

(1990)).
160. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
161. Id. Regarding the state's interest in the preservation of life, the court in In re Fetus
Brown asserts that this refers to the state's interest in "the life of the decision maker." Id.
Hence, inthe case of a pregnant woman, the state's interest in the preservation of life includes
the preservation of her life and not just the life of her fetus. In addition, the state's interest in
the preservation of life must be balanced with the state's interest in protecting the patient's
autonomy. Id. at 404.
In addition, both the American Medical Association and the ACOG have taken the
position that physicians should not, except under extraordinary circumstances, seek judicial
intervention to compel a pregnant woman to submit to non-consensual treatment. See AMA,
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medical profession"; 163 and (4) the protection of innocent third parties.16
Although a state may assert a compelling interest on these grounds, "these
factors are by no means a bright-line test, capable of resolving every dispute
regarding the refusal of medical treatment."' 65

Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 3, at 2666, 2670 (stating that judicial

intervention is appropriate only in "an exceptional circumstance"); ACOG, Patient Choice,
supra note 3 (physicians should refrain from non-consensual treatment; use of court orders to
resolve conflicts between physicians and patients are almost never appropriate). Arguably,
judicially compelled treatment ofpregnant women actually violates the integrity of the medical
profession. Joelyn Knopf Levy, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pregnancy, and Blood Transfusions: A
Paradigm for the Autonomy Rights ofAll Pregnant Women, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 171, 182

(1999) (noting that a physician is under no legal duty to seek a court order and the professional
medical organizations recommend against using such orders).
162. Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 402. It has been noted that "[n]o reported case has held that
a competent patient must undergo medical treatment he has refused in order to vindicate the
state's interest in the prevention of suicide." Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37
HASTINGS L.J. 703, 760 n.276 (1986); see also Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts:
The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients, Parents, and Healers, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.

599, 621 (1993).

163. Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 402. Courts have generally held that the integrity of the
medical profession is not disrupted by the protection of patients' autonomy embodied in the
right to refuse treatment. See id. at 403. But see Crouse Irving Mem'l Hosp. v. Paddock, 485
N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). In that case a pregnant Jehovah's Witness agreed to a
cesarean section operation but refused blood transfusions on religious grounds. Id. at 445. One
ofthe bases for the court's order compelling the transfusions was upholding the ethical integrity
ofthe medical profession; the physician must be allowed to stabilize apatient following surgery.
1d. at 445-46.
164. Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 402. Many of the most well-reasoned cases decided on this
state interest involve compulsory vaccination statutes, which override the freedom to refuse
medical treatment because of the state's interest in public health. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 38-39 (1905). Accordingly, the state's interest in the protection
of innocent third parties should be understood as the state's interest in the prevention of
epidemics and other major public health problems. Hence, the state's interest in the compelled
medical treatment ofpregnant women is not sufficiently public and, therefore, the state's interest
in this context is not heightened. Nevertheless, until recently, courts routinely overrode the
autonomy of female patients in order to protect their minor children from abandonment. See,
e.g., President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct 1985). More recently, courts have refused to subordinate patient autonomy to the state's
interest in protecting minor children. See, e.g., In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993)
(overruling district court opinion overriding mother's refusal of blood transfusion on grounds
of abandonment if she died); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 84 (N.Y. 1990) (refusing to
prohibit parents from participating in dangerous activities in order to prevent risk of orphaning
the children).
165. Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989).
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In addition, several state courts have held that the right to refuse medical
treatment is also protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. For example, in In re Estate of Brooks,' the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that, in the context of medical treatment, the Free Exercise
Clause "protects the absolute right of every individual to freedom in his
religious belief and the exercise thereof, subject only to the qualification that
the exercise thereof may properly be limited by governmental action where
such exercise endangers, clearly and presently, the public health, welfare or
morals."' 67 Similarly, in In re Melideo,"' a New York trial court specifically
reasoned that "where there is no compelling State interest which justifies
overi-iding an adult patient's decision not to receive blood transfusions
because of religious beliefs, such transfusions should not be ordered."' 69
Nevertheless, many courts have been resistant to decide such cases on free
exercise grounds and are content 70to rely on the common law right of bodily
integrity as a basis for judgment.°
B. Legal Rationalesfor the Use of Force
Despite the recognition in common and constitutional law of the right of
competent adults to refuse medical treatment for both religious and secular
reasons, courts that have compelled non-consensual treatment of pregnant
women typically have given three related rationales for the use of the law's
coercive power and its corresponding physical force. The first rationale is that
the state's interest in a fetus allows the state to override the pregnant woman's
right to make medical decisions. The second rationale utilizes a two-step
procedure. First, the courts reason that the fetus has a "right to life"

166.

205 N.E.2d 435 (II. 1965).

167.
168.

Id. at441.
390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).

169.

Id. at 524. Nevertheless, in this case, the court compelled the transfusion of a

Jehovah's Witness, who was the mother ofminor children, stating that the state'sparenspatriae

interest "mayjustify compulsory medical care where necessary to save the life of the mother
of young children." Id. Recent cases seem to suggest that this rationale is no longer used to
supportjudicial compulsion of non-consensual medical treatment. See, e.g., Dubreudi, 629 So.

2d at 828 (refusing to rely on the state's interest in minor children to coerce the blood
transfusion of their mother when there was no proof that the woman's children would be
abandoned if she died after refusing treatment).
170. See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 830-31 (Conn. 1996) (stating that
although a Jehovah's Witness refused to raise a free exercise claim, the court need not address
it because the woman had a common law right-to refuse treatment); Fosmire, 551 N.E.2d at 80
(same). My colleague, Professor Dena Davis, has suggested that these courts refuse to address

the free exercise claim because focusing on the free exercise claim in this context, when it is
believed that all competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment for any reason,
tends to privilege religious reasons over secular ones and runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause.
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equivalent to the right to life of a child; that right outweighs the pregnant
woman's right to make medical decisions regarding her own care or the care
of the fetus if such decision is at odds with the physician's advice. 7 ' After
making such a determination, courts rely on their parenspatriaeauthority to
authorize the recommended treatment. Finally, the third rationale for the use
of the state's power to compel treatment in this area has largely come from
conservative academic circles, which argue for an increased maternal duty to
the fetus. 7" All of these arguments favoring judicial intervention ignore the
issue of religious freedom and demonstrate that courts are hesitant to
acknowledge or protect the rights of members of religious groups with whom
they share few values.
1. The State's Interest in the Fetus
As we shall see, in many instances when courts compel treatment, they
rely heavily on the state's interest in a viable fetus as articulated by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case, Roe v. Wade.' Invalidating a Texas
statute criminalizing abortion, the Court in Roe made three important
announcements: (1) the right to privacy includes a woman's right to
abortion; ' (2) the state has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life,"' 75 which allows the state to regulate and even
prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus;' 76 and (3) the state's compelling interest
in a viable fetus does not override a woman's abortion decision when the
abortion is "necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."' 77 Courts
relying on Roe to support their decisions to compel medical treatment on
pregnant women solely emphasize the Roe Court's "compelling state interest
in a viable fetus" pronouncement, concluding that if the state's interest in a
viable fetus is significant enough to prohibit abortion, then it is also
significant enough to compel unwanted medical treatment for the fetus's
sake.' s Although appellate decisions regarding compelled medical treatment
of pregnant women have yet to rely upon other abortion decisions, this
171. I purposely use the phrase "the physician" instead of"her physician" when referring
to the attending physicians in these cases. The available data suggest that many of the women
involved may not have received prenatal care and hence do not have a physician with whom
they have worked throughout the pregnancy. See Kolder et al., supra note 5,at 1193; see also
Cherry, supra note 12, at 249.
172. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 179-80, 189 (1994).
173. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see infra notes 244-68 and accompanying text (citing and
discussing cases of compelled treatment heavily relying on Roe v. Wade).
174. Id.at 153.
175. Id.at 162, 163.
176. Id.at 163, 165.
177. Id.at 164.
178. See infra Part IIl.C for discussion of cases.
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argument may be strengthened by the Court's later decisions in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services'79 and Planned Parenthood v.Casey.80 In
Webster, the Court questioned viability as the point when the state's interest
in the fetus becomes compelling: "[W]e do not see why the State's interest
in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point
of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state
Later, in
regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability."''
Casey, the Court located the state's interest in the fetus "from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child."'8 2 Hence, the "interest in a viable fetus" argument
suggests, at the very least, that at viability the state's interest in the fetus
permits the state to act in almost any way that would prevent the destruction
of the fetus." 3
Notwithstanding its appeal among some trial and appellate courts, the
"compelling state interest in a viable fetus" argument, as outlined above,
misunderstands the state's responsibilities toward the pregnant woman. Roe
and the subsequent abortion cases make clear that a woman has the
constitutional right to put her own life and health before that of the fetus, even
after viability, and that the state is bound to respect and support that right.
The Court has repeatedly affirmed the right of a pregnant woman to put her
own medical needs before those of her fetus. For example, in Thornburgh v.
American College ofObstetriciansand Gynecologists,' the Court invalidated
portions of a Pennsylvania abortion statute that required physicians to use an
abortion technique in post-viability abortions' 85 that "'would provide the best
opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive unless'... that technique
'would present a significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the
pregnant woman.""8 6 The Court recognized that any requirement endorsing
or requiring an increase in maternal risk was unconstitutional. 8 "

179. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
180. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
181. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
182. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 869.
183. Conversely, Justice Stevens has on several occasions observed that fetuses have no
independent interests. For example, in Casey, Justice Stevens, quoting Roe v. Wade, opined
has generally been contingent upon live birth.
that the "[p]erfection of the [fetus's] interest[] ...
In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the "assertion that
the government's interest is static" in relation to fetal developments); infra Part III.B.2.
184. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
185. These are abortions performed to save the life or health of the pregnant woman.
186. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210(b) (1982)).
187. Id. at 768-79. The appellate court also ruled that the statute at issue "was
unconstitutional because it... failed to require that maternal health be the physician's paramount
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Even in Casey where the Court seemed to affirm the possibility of previability state "intervention on behalf of the developing child,"""8 the Court
severely constrained intervention before viability. It limited state intervention
to actions such as "taking steps to ensure that this choice [to abort] is
thoughtful and informed."' 89 In addition, it permitted state intervention only
so long as the intervention does not unduly burden the woman's right to an
abortion.'" With reference to the state's interest in a fetus post-viability, the
Court in Casey limited the breadth of state intervention by affirming the
woman's right to have an abortion after fetal viability if her life or health is
at risk.19 Hence, Casey reaffirmed the Roe and Thornburgh emphasis on
maternal health and health care decision-making.' 92
To reiterate, although many of the compelled medical treatment cases
focus on the language in Roe regarding the state's interest in a viable fetus, the
analyses misjudge the state's interest. While the state's interest in the viable
fetus may be compelling in the abortion context, it is not absolute. In fact, the
state's interest is not so broad as to limit or eviscerate a woman's interest in
her own health or the health of her fetus. 9 Hence, the state's compelling
interest in the fetus allows it to prevent abortion under limited circumstances,
but it does not empower the state to "choose between treatment options for the
pregnant woman when abortion is not an issue."' 94
2. The Fetus as a Child and the Use of the State's ParensPatriae
Authority
A second rationale for overriding pregnant women's refusals of medical
treatment is the state's power and responsibility arising out of its parens

consideration." Id. at 769. Although the Supreme Court did not directly address this portion of
the appellate opinion, the Court nevertheless seemed to affrm it by stating that it agreed with the
appellate court's analysis. Id.
188. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
189. Id. at 872.
190. Id. at 876. The Court explained, "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 877.
191. Id.at846,879.
192. Nancy Rhoden argued a somewhat similar point. She noted that "Roe merely allows
states to prohibit intentional fetal destruction after viability, unless abortion is needed to protect
the woman's life or health. It says nothing about whether the state may require invasive medical
procedures to promote fetal health." Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1953 (footnote omitted).
193. See Arch, supranote 5, at 650; Gallagher, supra note 5, at 28-29; Nelson et al., supra
note 162, at 742 (concluding that a state's compelling interest in the life of a fetus "is limited
by the mother's right of privacy").
194. Arch, supra note 5, at 649; see also Nelson et al., supra note 162, at 745 (arguing that
woman's health care interests and choices are superior to a state's interest in potential life of
fetus).
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patriaeauthority. The parenspatriaepower gives the state "a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare,"' 95 particularly when the life of a child is at issue.', As
suggested above, the state's power in this regard is limited to acting on behalf
of minor children or adults with diminished mental capacity. But the state
interest in the fetus cannot be one ofparenspatriae.As Justice Stevens noted
in Casey, "the fetus is not a person."' 97
Nevertheless, as a result of fetal murder statutes and wrongful death
causes of actions at the state level, it can be argued that the state's interest in
the viable fetus exists outside of the abortion context, or that the fetus has
some independent legal rights. Instead, I would argue that both fetal murder
statutes and wrongful death causes of action serve to recognize and vindicate
the parents' interest in the fetus, that but for the unlawful or wrongful actions
of a third party, would have become a child."' Consequently, in order to

195. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent& Child § 11 (1987) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944)).
196. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (I11. 1989) (stating that the state'sparenspatriae
power over minor children is greatest regarding health care issues that are potentially life
threatening); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425,429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (same); cf AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 2D Consent to Adoption § I (1980) (stating that a "child's welfare... [is] of
primary importance in the granting of an adoption decree").
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
198. A cause of action for prenatal injuries, including wrongful death, is generally allowed
only if the child is subsequently born alive. Hence, these causes of action afford rights not to
the fetus as a fetus, but rather to the fetus as a potential child. As Prosser and Keeton note, the
purpose of the wrongful death cause of action, like other tort actions, is to provide
compensation to the victim and to discourage harmful acts. KEETON ET AL., supra note 152, at
368. When these tort actions are not contingent on the "live birth" rule, reflected is a
"legitimate desire to protect the rights of the pregnant woman and the expectant father.... [It]
serves to compensate parents for the loss of their expected child and to protect the interest of
a woman who has chosen to carry her pregnancy to term." Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The
Creation ofFetalRights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy,
andEqual Protection,95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); see Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (Idaho
1982) (stating that the wrongful death statute of a "child" protects the interests of the parent and
not the decedent child); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832-22 (Iowa 1983) (stating
that under the wrongful death statute, loss compensated for wrong done to the child's parent).
Feticide statutes, which criminally sanction the destruction of the fetus by a third party, serve
interests similar to the tort causes of action. These criminal laws protect pregnant women from
severe bodily intrusion, physical harm, and the involuntary termination of a wanted pregnancy.
See Dawn Johnsen, From Drivingto Drugs: Government Regulation ofPregnant Women's
Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 186 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (1989)
(focusing on the protection of the pregnant woman rather than on the fetus); see also Alison
Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or Sword to Pierce
Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 461-68 (1998) (describing the differences
among state statutes that criminalize feticide). But see Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C.
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power on behalf of the fetus, the state must first obscure
assertparenspatriae
the meaningful distinctions between a fetus and a child.' 99 Once the state
gives the fetus the attributes of a child, a woman's failure to provide medical
care to that child/fetus, or more accurately, the woman's failure to consent to
medical care for herself, when the state and physicians believe that the care
would benefit the fetus, constitutes neglect.2 °
After the distinctions between a fetus and a child are obscured and the
parenspatriaepower is asserted, the court is then free to appoint a guardian
to take actions as the state deems necessary on behalf of the child/fetus,"° '
including consenting to surgery on the woman's body or blood transfusions.
Once the fetus is legally transformed into a child, little if any attention is
given to the physical location of the fetus, which is inside of a woman's body.
"[F]etuses live in women's bodies," 2" yet no attention is given to the fact that
access to the fetus can only be gained by literally going through a woman's
body, and that a woman might have rights that need to be respected. Hence,
once the transformation is complete, neither the court, the guardian, nor the

1997) (holding the defendant criminally responsible for harm done to fetus in utero under child
abuse statute, seemingly giving rights to fetus qua fetus); cf S.C. CODE ANN. §20-7-50 (2000)
(including in the definition of child in criminal child neglect statute).
199. See infra notes 244-56 and accompanying text (regarding In re Madyun and In re
JamaicaHosp.). Courts compelling non-consensual treatment by comparing fetuses to children
do so in the face of a disavowal of federal law. For example, the Supreme Court in Roe clearly
stated that the fetus was not a person for constitutional purposes. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
158 (1973). Furthermore, congressional attempts to define "persons" to include fetuses under
the Fourteenth Amendment have repeatedly failed. See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981)
(defining "person" to include the unborn for the purpose of the right to life guarantee under the
Fourteenth Amendment); S. 1741, 97th Cong. § I(a) (1981) (declaring for the purpose of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that human life "begins at conception");
H.R. 900, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981) (defining "person" to include unborn for the purpose of the
right to life guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment).
200. See Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: OfRights,
Responsibility, and DecisionalAuthenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 261 (1991) (stating that
refusing medical care is like refusing "to refill the feeding tube of a comatose patient").
Professor Phillip Johnson makes a slightly different argument than the one most often made by
courts. Johnson does not argue that there are no differences between a fetus and a child; rather,
he argues that these differences are inconsequential because the harm that may be done to the
fetus will affect it when it is a child. Johnson, supra note 5, at 135. Hence, he focuses more
directly on the harm to the child that the fetus will become. For example, he argues that "[i]f
a mother has a legal duty and a moral duty to refrain from deliberately starving her infants after
the moment of birth, then there is no reason to exempt her from that duty during pregnancy,
when the likelihood of damage to the child's current health is just as great." Id. at 136.
201. But see In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,406 (ll. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that the
appointment of a guardian for the fetus is inappropriate in this case because it involved only a
pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment against the state's interest in a viable fetus
and the fetus had no rights that a guardian could represent).
202. PURDY, supra note 2, at 90.
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physician must consider the woman and her interest in herself or her fetus.
She, like any other neglectful mother, can be moved aside. She is unimportant.
She is merely a "fortress against fetal health care," ' 3 and, like any fortress, can
be destroyed ifenough force is used. But as Nancy Rhoden noted, "equating the
woman's refusal of a Cesarean to fetal neglect is improper because it focuses
entirely upon the fetus and ignores the fact that a surgical intrusion upon the
woman's body is also at issue."
Moreover, it is inappropriate for the parenspatriaepower to be activated
whenever a pregnant woman refuses medical care on behalf of her fetus. Such
an action makes informed consent meaningless.0 5 The right to make a decision
about one's medical treatment necessarily includes the right to reject the advice
of the physician. Use of the state's parenspatriaepower in this context gives
the state too much power to enforce its own preferences, regardless of what
might actually be in the best interest of the fetus it is claiming to protect. The
late Joseph Goldstein made this point with respect to the use of the parens
patriaepower in the context of sick children:
Legislatures must be made to see that the requisite of parental consent to
medical care for children becomes meaningless if refusal to consent
automatically triggers state inquiry or a finding ofneglect. State statutes then
must be revised to hold in check, not release, the rescue fantasies of those it
empowers to intrude, and thus to safeguard families from state-sponsored
interruptions of ongoing family relationships by well-intentioned people who
"know" what is "best" and who wish to impose their personal health-care
preferences on others.2'

203. Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health
Care?, 65 S.CAL. L. REv. 461,461 (1991).
204. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1968.
205. With regards to the voluntariness of informed consent, it has been noted:
Because of the inherent imbalance of power in the physician-patient relationship, the
manner and order in which physicians present information can greatly influence the
importance patients attach to different considerations and can, intentionally, or
otherwise, persuade the patient to select the option favored by the physician.
Therefore, the physician has a duty to distance himself as much as possible form
his personal preferences and values and to present information in a manner that reflects
an objective assessment of the interests at stake for the patient. Physicians also must be
sensitive to the fact that patients are likely to interpret a suggestion, or even the mere
mention of an option, as a recommendation. To counteract this danger, bioethicists
recommend that physicians actively and explicitly encourage patients to make decisions
independently.
Svoboda et al., supra note 147, at 72.
206.

Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of

ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 651 (1977).
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3. Increased Legal Duties Toward the Fetus
A third rationale found in the cases compelling medical treatment has
largely been advocated by academics and has not found its way into court
opinions compelling non-consensual treatment. This rationale rests primarily
on the belief that once a woman forgoes an abortion for whatever reason, she
has legally and morally waived her autonomy and accepts, or is bound to, an
increased duty toward her fetus. This increased duty requires her to do
whatever is necessary to prevent harm to the fetus. Professor John Robertson
has repeatedly made the argument that "[s]he waived her right to resist bodily
intrusions made for the sake of the fetus when she chose to continue the
pregnancy."2 °7 In Casey, Justice O'Connor adopted Robertson's argument and
in dicta opined, "In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails
to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of
the developing child."2 °8 Justice O'Connor's statement suggests that
ultimately this argument may not rely on the state's interest in a viable fetus
or on any real notion of fetal personhood. Rather, this position may rely upon
the power of the state to protect the child that the fetus will ultimately
become. 2"
Nevertheless, the arguments regarding the pregnant woman's increased
duties toward her fetus have been supported by references to legal doctrines
regarding the duty to rescue. These arguments, however, are not as clear as
their proponents would have us believe. For example, it has been argued that
because the criminal law imposes on parents a limited duty to rescue their
children, pregnant women also owe a duty to rescue the fetuses they carry.2 1
However, this reliance on parental duties towards children is entirely
misplaced. As Professor Donald Regan argues, the burdens imposed on
parents are not physical burdens that require the loss of the parents' physical
autonomy.2" The physical burdens of pregnancy and childbirth significantly
challenge the parenthood analogy. Regan notes that the burdens of pregnancy
"are of a different kind. Being a mother (of a child, not a fetus) does not alter

207. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty,supranote 5, at 445; see alsoROBERTSON,supra note
172, at 189; Finer, supra note 200, at 259; John A. Robertson, The Right to Procreateand in
Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 352 (1982); Margery W. Shaw, Conditional
ProspectiveRights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984).
208. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
209. Deborah Mathieu makes this point more succinctly. She argues that the pregnant
woman's "obligation[] ...would be to the future child, not to the fetus." DEBORAH MATHIEU,
PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM: SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE? 47 (2d ed. 1996).
210. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 172,179-80; Finer, supra note 200, at 259; see also
Commonwealth v. Konz, 450 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1982) (stating that the duty to rescue is based
on "inherent dependency of a child upon his parent"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMNAL LAW21516 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the standard criminal law duties of parents toward a child); cf
MATHIEU, supra note 209, at 47.
211. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1583 (1979).
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the entire functioning of a woman's body the way being pregnant does."2' 12
Therefore, to treat pregnant women like parents of children, in this context,
disregards the pregnant woman's greater physical burden and disadvantages
her in ways not intended by the duty to rescue doctrine.
In addition, the duty to rescue requires that parents "take every step
reasonablypossible under the circumstances of a given situation to prevent
harm to their children." ' Accordingly, the duty to rescue analogy relies on
the belief that cesarean section surgery or blood transfusions are reasonable
under any circumstances," 4 including when they are refused on religious
grounds.
Proponents of this argument also rely on the tort law duty in the law of
mandatory rescue. This doctrine states that the person who caused the danger,
or the person who starts to rescue the endangered person and thereby "'makes
rescue by others impossible or unlikely, has a duty to complete the rescue. "225
Consequently, proponents argue that this tort duty also requires that a woman
submit to unwanted procedures for the sake of her fetus. 6 In this scenario, the
pregnant woman caused the peril to the fetus by continuing the pregnancy or
by refusing the medical care deemed appropriate by physicians, and by
beginning to care for the fetus she makes rescue by others impossible or
unlikely.2 17
These duty to rescue arguments are based on a misunderstanding of two
central components of the duty: voluntariness and reasonableness. Professor
Donald Regan has noted the importance of voluntary action in the duty to

212. Id.
213. Finer, supra note 200, at 258 (quoting State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (N.C.
1982)) (emphasis added); see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d)(1) (West 1996) (stating that
"[a] person need not comply with" the subsection mandating duty to aid victim if"[c]ompliance
would place him or her in danger"); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 56 (1965).
214. Finer makes this argument. Finer, supra note 200, at 259 (arguing that, given the
large number of consensual Caesarean sections performed every year, it is reasonable to expect
women to submit to the surgery). I believe that he would make a similar argument regarding
blood transfusions. However, given the number of unnecessary cesarean sections performed
annually in this country, I question the reasonableness of consenting to one. See Leslie
Laurence, Unkindest Cuts? CaesareanSections Come Under Watchdogs' Scrutiny, CHi. TRIB.,
June 6, 1993, at 5; U.S. Says 349,000 Caesareansin 1991 Were Not Necessary, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 1993, at A16; see also Espinoza, supra note 151, at 212 n.6 (stating that it is
reasonable for women to question the appropriateness of a recommended Caesarean section).
215. Finer, supra note 200, at 258.
216. ROBERTSON, supra note 172, at 179; Finer, supra note 200, at 258. A similar duty,
based on the creation of peril, also exists in criminal law. LAFAVE, supra note 210, at 218-19;
see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 613-14 (1978).
217. See, e.g., Finer, supra note 200, at 259. Jeffrey Phelan makes a different argument
regarding the duty to rescue. He asserts that it is the physician who has a duty to rescue, and
the pregnant woman should not be permitted to prevent him from fulfilling his obligation to the
fetus. Phelan, supra note 203, at 482-83.
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rescue doctrine. He argues that the purpose of the duty is to establish the
general proposition that we are not legally obligated to render aid simply
because someone requires it. He writes, "One can turn one's back on
another's need, declining to subordinate one's own interests."28 Hence, the
duty to rescue limits what is legally required of a potential rescuer. As Regan
argues, the common law recognizes these limits because we value the freedom
to resist subordination in both trivial and non-trivial ways.2 19 Resisting
subordination has historically included practices that involve both minor and
major physical invasions or pain.220 "We are traditionally very dubious,"
Professor Regan argues, "about practices which involve direct invasions of the
22
body or the imposition of physical pain or extreme physical discomfort.9 1
One example of the common law principles of autonomy, nonsubordination, and its suspicion ofcompelling rescue that entails physical pain
on the part of the rescuer, is found in McFallv. Shimp.222 In McFall,the court
refused to order Shimp to "donate" bone marrow to his cousin even though his
cousin needed Shimp's bone marrow to save his life.2 ' The court stated,
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one
human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to
save another human being or to rescue.... For our law to compel defendant
to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and
principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no
limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.224
As noted above, the requirement of reasonableness is also part and parcel
of the duty to rescue. The duty to rescue requires only that a potential rescuer
exercise reasonable care and that rescue is not required when reasonable care
of the rescuer cannot be attained. As Professor Charity Scott notes, "the one
who renders aid is not necessarily required to assume personal risk of harm
to herself in doing so. In other words, there is generally no legal obligation
to undertake a 'risky' rescue. "225

218.
219.

Regan, supranote211,at 1574.
Id. at 1583-84.

220.

Id. at 1584.
Id. at 1583; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 206-07(1974).

221.
222.

10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).

223.

Id. at 90.

224.
225.

Id. at 91.
Charity Scott, Resisting the Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations into

JudicialOrders: A Reconsideration ofCourt-OrderedSurgeryfor Pregnant Women, 10 GA.

ST. U. L. REv. 615, 657 (1994). Regan makes a similar point, noting that outside the context
of anti-abortion laws, no other Samaritan or potential rescuer is forced to take on the types of
physical burdens and risks associated with pregnancy. Regan, supra note 211, at 1569, 1572.
He argues that this creates an equal protection violation if abortion is prohibited. Id.
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Furthermore, these duty to rescue analogies are also inappropriate because
they confuse moral duties with legal duties, or as Dr. James Nocon asserts,
'
they "confuse[] the [moral] duty to care with the [legal] duty to rescue." 226
Although parents have a moral duty to provide for the health and safety of
their children, under no circumstances does a parent have a legal duty to put
herself in peril in order to rescue a child. As Nocon notes, "If there is no duty
to rescue a child, that is, a person with cognizable rights, it does not follow
that there should be a duty to rescue a fetus or a corresponding fetal 'right' to
' Hence, the duty to rescue analogy argued by Finer, Robertson,
be rescued."227
and others assumes that the fetus has more rights than a child and more rights
than the pregnant woman. As the court in In reA.C. stated, "Surely, however,
a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior to those of a person who has
already been born.""22 The court in In re Baby Boy Doe agreed, stating that
"[a] woman is under no duty to guarantee the mental and physical health of
her child at birth, and thus cannot be compelled to do or not to do anything
merely for the benefit of her unborn child."229 Moreover, the duty to rescue
analogy is misplaced because it is supported by the notion that the state has
the power to promote the greater social good and the sanctity of human life
and that the interest of the individual woman, or women as a social group, is
subordinate to that of the larger society.23 '
In sum, as I have argued elsewhere 23 ' and as noted above, all of the
arguments in favor of increased maternal duties are deeply flawed. Women
choose not to abort for many reasons, none of which signal that the woman
has somehow agreed to accept a new social contract in which she is legally
required to subordinate her interest in herself and her interest in her fetus to
the desires of physicians and the state.
C. The Cases: The States' Use of Force

Since 1964, state courts have used both the coercive power of the law and
its corresponding physical force to compel non-consensual blood transfusions
and surgery for the sake of a fetus on the basis of fetal rights. For example,
in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,2 3 2 the
226.

Nocon, supra note 152, at 21.

227.

Id.

228. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
229. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
230. Arch, supra note 5, at 652. Professor Lisa Ikemoto refines this critique. She reasons
that the arguments expanding the state's interest in the viable fetus beyond the realm of abortion
presuppose both that there is "a hierarchy of interests, with those of women subordinated to
those of the 'greater good,"' as represented by the fetus, and that "pregnant women[] are
outsiders whose claims are potentially harmful to the concept of ordered liberty." Ikemoto,
supra note 17, at 493, 492.
231. Cherry, supra note 12, at 246.
232. 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964).
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Supreme Court of New Jersey equated the fetus in utero to a child and
compelled an unwanted blood transfusion on a pregnant Jehovah's Witness.2 3 a
Although the trial court held that it would not intervene, the state supreme
court decided to compel the transfusion.23 4 Without more, the court held
simply that it was "satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's
protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood
transfusions to the mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion
'
of the physician in charge at the time." 235
The Supreme Court of Georgia used a similar rationale in its attempt to
require a woman to have a cesarean section against her wishes.236 In Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital, Mrs. Jefferson refused to consent to
cesarean section surgery on religious grounds.237 Although the physician's
prognosis predicted a ninety-nine percent chance of fetal death and a fifty
percent chance of maternal death without surgery, Mrs. Jefferson nevertheless
believed "that the Lord ha[d] healed her body and that whatever happens to
the child [was] the Lord's will."2 The trial court ordered the surgery based
on its finding that "as a matter of law.., this child is a viable human being
and entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia. The
Court concluded that this child is without the proper parental care and
subsistence necessary for his or her physical life and health."239 Accordingly,
the trial court granted temporary custody of the fetus to the state's child
welfare agency, authorizing it "to make all decisions, including giving consent
to the surgical delivery appertaining to the birth of this child."'" ° Furthermore,
the trial court found that any "intrusion. .. into the life of [Mrs.] Jefferson
and her husband ...[was] outweighed by the duty of the state to protect a
living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death before being given
the opportunity to live."24 ' Although Mrs. Jefferson filed a motion to stay the
trial court's decision.242 The Supreme Court of Georgia denied the motion
summarily citing the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
and the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Raleigh Fitkin. 243
New York trial courts have followed the trend set in the New Jersey and
Georgia cases. They have compelled transfusions for pregnant women who
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.at 538.
Id.
Id.
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id.

243. Id. Nevertheless, Mrs. Jefferson gave birth to a healthy child in a vaginal delivery.
Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1959-60. She delivered without the assistance of medical personnel.
Id.
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have resisted such procedures on religious grounds. Citing to both the state's
interest in a fetus-which in this case was not yet viable-and the court's
parens patriaepower, a New York trial court in In re JamaicaHospitaP"
2 45
ordered the transfusion of an eighteen-week-pregnant Jehovah's Witness.
Although the court noted that the pregnant woman "has an important and
protected interest in the exercise of her religious beliefs," it held that her
interests could be disregarded because of her pregnancy. 246 The court
reasoned that it "must consider the life of the unborn fetus."247 Citing Roe for
the proposition that "in the context of abortion.... the state has a significant
interest in protecting the potential of human life represented by an unborn
fetus," and recognizing that the eighteen-week-old fetus was not yet viable,248
the court, nevertheless, compelled the transfusion without more than the
conclusory reference to Roe:
While... the fetus in this case is not yet viable, and... the state's
interest in protecting its life would be less than "compelling" in the context
of the abortion cases, this is not such a case. In this case, the state has a
highly significant interest in protecting the life of a nid-term fetus, which
outweighs
the patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
249
grounds.
The court then equated the fetus to a child and asserted its parenspatriae
jurisdiction.2 0 The court appointed a physician as guardian to the fetus, with
authority "to do all that in his medical judgment was necessary to save [the
fetus'] life, including the transfusion of blood into the mother."25 '
The District of Columbia Superior Court has also compelled at least one
cesarean section surgery despite the pregnant woman's religious objections.
In In re Madyun,5 2 the trial court dismissed the depth of a Muslim woman's
religious claims, saying that "it is evident that the stronger basis for their
individual decision was the belief that the surgical procedure was not
necessary." 2" Relying on Roe, Raleigh Fitkin, and JamaicaHospital, the
court held that the compelling interest of the state may "justify overriding

244. 491 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
245. Id. at 899.
246. Id. at 899-900.

247.

Id. at 899.

248.
249.
250.

Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 900.
Id.

251. Id.; see also Crouse Irving Mern'l Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443,444-45 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (equating the fetus to a child and using its parens patriae power to authorize
blood transfusions of a pregnant Jehovah's Witness in the late stages of pregnancy).
252. 114 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).
253.

Id. at 2239.
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religious convictions in cases of unborn infants." 54 Furthermore, like the
courts in the aforementioned cases, the court compared the fetus to a child and
asserted itsparenspatriaepower to impose the surgery by force. 25" However,
the precedential value of this case was called into serious question by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re A. C. That court held that "it
was error for the trial court to weigh the state's interest in preserving the
potential life of a viable fetus against" the pregnant woman's right to refuse
medical treatment.5 6
More recently, in Pembertonv. TallahasseeMemorialRegionalMedical
Center,"' a federal district court upheld a state court order compelling a
cesarean section on a woman who refused the surgery because she wanted to
deliver her baby naturally.258 When Mrs. Pemberton refused to consent to the
cesarean section and left the hospital, the hospital called its attorney who in
turn called in the state attorney.25 9 After a hearing with hospital officials and
doctors, the trial court ordered Mrs. Pemberton to return to the hospital.2 "
The state attorney, using the full force of the law, went to Mrs. Pemberton's
home with a police officer and forced her to return to the hospital via
ambulance. 26 ' After a second hearing in Mrs. Pemberton's hospital room, the
trial court ordered the cesarean section, and the surgery was performed.2 62 In
federal court, Mrs. Pemberton argued that her constitutional rights were
violated, including her First Amendment right to free exercise. 2 3 Like the
courts in the aforementioned cases, the court in Pemberton gave short shrift
to the pregnant woman's claims, and her constitutional rights were traded
against the right to life of the fetus:
Recognizing these constitutional interests, however, is only the
beginning, not the end, of the analysis. Ms. Pemberton was at full term and
actively in labor. It was clear that one way or the other, a baby would be
born (or stillborn) very soon, certainly within hours. Whatever the scope of
Ms. Pemberton's personal constitutional rights in this situation, they clearly

254.
255.
256.

Id. at 2240.
Id.
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).

257. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
258. Id. at 1249. The physicians at the Medical Center predicted that the odds of Mrs.
Pemberton having a successful vaginal birth were slight given that she previously had a cesarean
section in which a vertical incision was used. Id. The previous incision dramatically increased
the risk of uterine rupture and the risk of death to Mrs. Pemberton and her fetus. Id.
259. Id. In Florida, the State Attorney has"the responsibility under Florida law to institute any
court proceeding seeking to compel a medical procedure without a patient's consent" Id.
at 1249-50.
260. Id. at 1250.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1251. The court noted that Mrs. Pemberton did not specify any special religious
belief that had been violated. Id.
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did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in preserving the life of
the unborn child.2"
As in Jefferson, Jamaica Hospital, and In re Madyun, the Pemberton court
asserted that it's holding was supported by Roe v. Wade.2 6' The court held
that the pregnant woman's interests were subordinate to the state's interests
in fetal life.2 66 The court declared,
The balance tips far more strongly in favor of the state in the case at bar,
because here the full-term baby's birth was imminent, and more importantly,
here the mother sought only to avoid a particular procedure for giving birth,
not to avoid giving birth altogether. Bearing an unwanted child is surely a
greater intrusion on the mother's constitutional interests than undergoing a
caesarean section to deliver a child that the mother affirmatively desires to
deliver. Thus the state's interest here was greater, and the mother's interest
in Roe. Here, as
less, than during the third trimester situation addressed
2 67
there, the state's interest outweighed the mother's.
The foregoing analysis reveals that in the majority of reported cases,
pregnant women who refuse medical treatment that would purportedly benefit
their fetuses do so on religious grounds. The analysis also exposes that the
rationales used for overriding these women's rights to refuse medical
treatment are misplaced. Some religiously motivated refusals are ignored by
courts on a fallacious interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v.
Wade, reasoning that any interest that the state may have in the fetus is
sufficient to outweigh the woman's rights. Although Roe and its progeny may
narrow the pregnant woman's right to direct her medical treatment, they do so
in a very limited fashion. The state may only prohibit the abortion of a viable
fetus and then only if the woman's life or health is not at risk. Hence, even
considering the Court's opinions in Roe and the abortion cases that followed
it, pregnant women retain the right to direct their medical care, including the

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1251-52 (footnotes omitted). The court noted, but disregarded, the argument
that the state's intervention in a woman's pregnancy is more intrusive than the state's
prohibition of a third trimester abortion. Id. at 1252. It stated,
One could argue that affirmative intervention is more intrusive on the mother's
constitutional interests than the mere prohibition discussed in Roe. But any such
distinction between affirmative conduct and mere prohibitions is superficial.... [A] thirdtrimester mother can be forced against her will to bear a child she does not want; this is in
fact a substantially greater imposition on the mother's constitutional interests than
requiring a mother to give birth by one method rather than another. And this is so
notwithstanding that caesarean section is major surgery that is extraordinarily intrusive on
the mother's constitutional interests.
Id.
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right to refuse medical treatment that might enhance fetal life or health.
Other courts have relied upon the state's parenspatriaepower, and some
have suggested that an increased maternal duty toward the fetus supports the
judicial compulsion of medical treatment in this context. These rationales for
compelling treatment are equally erroneous. The first completely ignores
maternal autonomy, while the second assumes that fetal rights, as designated
by a physician or the state, are legally more significant than the maternal
autonomy that is supported by the common law and constitutional rights to
refuse treatment.
In the end, the failure to protect the religiously motivated refusals of
medical treatment of pregnant women may demonstrate our failure to take
religious claims made by political outsiders seriously. As Bette Novit Evans
notes with respect to compelled blood transfusions:
In a way, the failure to protect religious refusal of medical care suggests a
shortcoming we observed inLyng. In both instances, authorities seem unable
to imagine and take seriously belief systems out of the mainstream-in this
instance, a belief system that places less emphasis on life than on purity and
obedience. Protecting alternate sources of meaning requires a willingness to
take seriously the fact that other people could hold entirely different
worldviews 68
IV. THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF WOMEN WHO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT: NEUTRALITY, GENERAL APPLICABILITY, HYBRID CASES, AND
SYSTEMS OF INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS IN THE POSTSMITH WORLD

All pregnant women, under the privacy rubric of the right to refuse
medical treatment, retain the right to direct their medical treatment even when
their decisions negatively affect the fetuses they carry. When these refusals
are religiously motivated, the Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious
belief as well as religiously motivated conduct, is implicated. State action that
forbids this religious conduct must satisfy the burdens of free exercise
jurisprudence if the state action is to be deemed constitutional. If the state
fails in its burden, the state action-in this case, the judicial compulsion of
medical treatment-is unconstitutional.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Smith held that neutral
laws of general applicability that burden the free exercise of religion are not
subj ect to strict scruiiny." 9 Rather, strict scrutiny is constitutionally mandated
only in cases when the law is not neutral or generally applicable, or when the
claim falls into one of two categorical exceptions: (1) the free exercise claim
is a hybrid claim, implicating another constitutional right; or (2) the law or

268.
269.

EVANS, supra note 30, at 110.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990).
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state action contains a system of individualized assessments or exemptions
that permits discriminatory action against religious exercise. Only in these
instances must the state demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to
override the free exercise claim.
In the case of pregnant women, the laws compelling medical treatment are
not generally applicable, although they are neutral. In addition, the free
exercise claims of these women fall into the hybrid claim category created by
the Court in Smith. Perhaps most significant is that the women's claims also
fall under Smith's individualized assessments and exemptions category.
Physicians, acting outside of their role as counselors and instead acting as
agents of the state, determine which pregnant women are turned over to the
court for judicial action compelling treatment.
Hence, because the women's claims are encompassed in the exceptions
outlined in Smith, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest that is
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose in order to compel medical treatment
of pregnant women in the face of a religious objection.
A. Neutrality and GeneralApplicability
Since the Smith decision in 1990, the Supreme Court has decided only one
free exercise case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
" ' church challenged an ordinance that
Hialeah.2 7 In this case, a Santeria27
prohibited the sacrificial killing of animals, purportedly on the basis of public
health and animal cruelty concerns. 72 The Court held that the statute violated
the Santeria worshipers' free exercise rights because it was not neutral in fact,
nor was it generally applicable.273
In determining neutrality, the Court looked at the terms of the statute and
the actions ofthe legislative body when it enacted the statute.274 To satisfy the
test for neutrality, the Court held that the city ordinance must be at the very

270. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
271. Santeria is a form of Yoruban religion that was developed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries by Yoruban slaves in Cuba who were forced to convert to Christianity. Id.
at 524. Their descendants practice this today. It is estimated that Santeria has two million
adherents in the United States and seventy-five to one hundred million adherents worldwide.
Rick Mitchell, The Believers: Underthe Spell of a ControversialAfrican Religion, Cm. TRM.,
Apr. 20, 1988, at S IC. For in-depth accounts of Santeria, see JOSEPH M. MURPHY, SANTERIA:
AN AFRICAN RELIGION IN AMERICA (1988); MARTA MORENO VEGA, THE ALTAR OF MY SOUL:

THE LIVNG TRADITIONS OF SANTERIA (2000).

272.
273.

Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527-28.
Id. at 542, 545-46.

274. Id. at 534-37; see Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally
Applicable Laws and Exceptionsfrom Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1053, 1081 (2000)
(arguing that Smith requires deference towards legislative determinations except when
legislative actions are not neutral or generally applicable).
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least facially neutral;27 5 it must not refer to religious practices that are without
a secular meaning. 276 Non-neutrality can also be demonstrated by a showing
of a discriminatory legislative motive.277 Accordingly, the Court in Lukumi
adopted formal neutrality as the constitutional standard.278
Given that formal neutrality requires only facial neutrality or a nondiscriminatory legislative motive, in the case of compelled medical treatment
of pregnant women, the "law" will most likely meet this requirement. The
judicial authorization of medical treatment in this context is not pursuant to
specific legislation. Rather, courts take their authority from general
jurisdiction statutes, 2 juvenile jurisdiction statutes, 280 or the statutory or
common law power ofparenspatriae.8 ' None of the laws used to invoke the
court's authority are facially discriminatory, nor do they have as their purpose
impermissible discrimination on the basis of religion.
With regard to general applicability, the Court in Lukumi looked at the
operation of the law to determine whether the law encouraged unequal
treatment. Under this rubric, a law that burdens only religious conduct,28 2 or
one that burdens the conduct of a particular religion while protecting the
conduct of another, is impermissible." 3 The ordinance in Lukumi treated the
religious and secular slaughter of animals differently even when the harms

275. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 534-35. The lead opinion also suggested that the law had to be neutral in its
purpose, in that it could not have a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 534. But as Douglas Laycock
points out, the lead opinion had only two votes on the issue of whether discriminatory motive
was needed. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court andReligious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25,
28 (2000) [hereinafter Laycock, The Supreme Court andReligious Liberty]. The remainder of
the Justices either dissented or believed that demonstrating bad motive was not necessary to
demonstrate a lack of neutrality. Id.; cf Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (stating that although the university policy was neutral, it was invalid
because it targeted the purpose of a religious student group's publication).
278. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
see also supraPart II.A.
279. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,403-04 (III. App. Ct. 1997); Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457, 459 (Ga. 1981) (rendering judgment

as both a juvenile court and under broad powers of the superior court).
280. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 459 (petition from state department of Family and Children
Services); see, e.g., O1Ho R.Juv. P. 11(b), JR 11(c)(regarding jurisdiction of the juvenile court
with respect to child abuse and neglect and emergency medical treatment, respectively).
281. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
282.

Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.

283. Id. at 536 (noting that the ordinance targets Santeria practice while exempting Kosher
slaughter); see also id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("General applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms,
through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion
for discriminatory treatment.").
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generated by the killings were the same. 2 It also was designed to burden
Santeria worship while exempting Jewish kosher slaughter from its dictates."8 5
In addition, the law was not generally applicable in the plain meaning of the
phrase. As Douglas Laycock argues, general applicability means that "the law
has to apply to everyone, or nearly everyone, or else the burden on religious
exercise must be justified under the compelling interest test. '28 , In Lukumi,
the statute did not ban other types of animal killing with similar public health
consequences, such as killing for research or for sport;287 hence, not everyone
or nearly everyone was burdened. Instead, as the Court held, the ordinance
specifically targeted the practices and the members of the Santeria religion.288
treatment required the state to demonstrate a
As a result, this unequal
289
compelling interest.
Lower courts have attempted to apply these standards for neutrality and
general applicability. For example, in FraternalOrder of Police v. City of
Newark,290 the Third Circuit invalidated a ban on beards because it violated
some police officers' free exercise rights.2 9' The ordinance required that all
uniformed officers be clean-shaven, absent a valid medical reason. 92 The
plaintiffs, Sunni Muslims, argued that requiring them to shave their beards
required them to violate their religious beliefs. "9 3 The court held that the
ordinance was not generally applicable, but rather it was intentionally
discriminatory, reasoning that the court "ha[s] before [it] a policy the very
purpose of which is to suppress manifestations of the religious diversity that
the First Amendment safeguards. '29 The city's allowance of medical, and
therefore secular, exemptions was seen as suggesting discriminatory intent.
The court held that "the medical exemption raises concern because it indicates
that the Department has made a value judgment that secular... motivations
its general interest in
for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome
'295
uniformity but that religious motivations are not.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See id. at 236-37.
Id. at 236.
Laycock, The Supreme Court and ReligiousLiberty, supra note 277, at 27.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
Id.
Laycock, The Supreme Court and ReligiousLiberty, supra note 277, at 28.
170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 360.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 366; see also Hines v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 148 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 1998)

(reviewing a clean-shaven regulation in respect to prisoners, which contained exemptions for

valid medical reason, the court held that there was no free exercise violation because the
regulation's purpose was to promote discipline and safety in the prisons, not to suppress
religious diversity); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50, 69 (D.D.C. 2000)
(same).
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Similarly, in Rader v. Johnston,296 a federal district court invalidated a
University of Nebraska parietal rule requiring all freshmen, except those
exempted by a university official, to live in university dormitories. 9 The
plaintiff, an evangelical Christian, requested to live off-campus in a religious
group house. 98 The university policy allowed a university administrator to
exempt students on a case-by-case basis for "significant and truly exceptional
circumstances." 2 Throughout the history of the policy, the university had
made several exemptions on this basis but never for a religious reason. 3" The
paucity of religious exemptions, in combination with the abundance of
exemptions for non-religious reasons, led the court to hold that the policy was
neither neutral nor generally applicable."'
In the case of compelled medical treatment, the laws operate in such a
way as to unequally burden the religious conduct of women, particularly
women of minority faiths. 32 The reported cases of compelled treatment
overwhelmingly involve women with religious claims. In the cases involving
coerced blood transfusions, all of the women so coerced asserted a religious
claim and were Jehovah's Witnesses, a minority religious group. This tends
to be true because of the means by which these cases are brought to the
courts' attention. The only cases brought to the courts' attention are those that
physicians bring, and physicians bring only those cases in which the woman's
reasons for resisting treatment conflict with the physician's own ethics or
moral values.30 3 In this context, the state relies on the physician to decide the
best course of treatment for the fetus and the pregnant woman, and then the
state "willing[ly] collaborat[es] in the physician's endeavor to supplant their
own ethics and moral values for those of the woman." 3 4
Neither is the state action generally applicable in the plain meaning of the
phrase as required by the Court in Smith. Unless we assume that women of
other faiths never, or rarely ever, refuse to comply with their physician's
296. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
297. Id. at 1543.

298. Id.
299. Id. at 1546.
300. Id. at 1549, 1552-54. Laycock points out that Rader"shows how relevant exceptions
can be found in the history of implementation as well as the face of the rule." Laycock, The
Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, supra note 277, at 33-34.

301. Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553, 1555.
302. Ultimately, these cases are also equal protection cases. Pregnant women, particularly
those of minority faiths, are disparately impacted by facially neutral standards and practices.
In balancing the free exercise concerns of these women with the state's interest in the
potentiality of the fetus, or the interest of the physician as the gatekeeper/agent of the state (see
discussion infra at pp. 619-20 and accompanying notes), the pregnant woman's free exercise
claim must prevail. Anything less results in an evisceration ofboth the free exercise right, the
right of bodily integrity, and the liberty to refuse medical treatment.
303. See Arch, supra note 5, at 642; Oberman, supra note I, at 454.
304. Arch, supra note 5, at 642.
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suggested course of treatment, we must wonder why pregnant women of
majority faith groups are not judicially compelled into treatment. Perhaps
physicians have more respect for their religious motivations. a 5
B. Hybrid Cases
In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission," the Ninth Circuit

outlined the three approaches federal courts have used in an attempt to make
sense of the hybrid rights exception articulated in Smith.3 "7 The Ninth Circuit
found that courts require "an independently viable companion right in addition
to free exercise";30 8 "require[] only a 'colorable claim of infringement,' that
is, something less than an outright violation of a companion right yet more
than a simple allegation"; 3" or refuse to recognize the category all together.3"'
In addition, some courts have noted the confusion inherent in the Smith
formulation of the hybrid category. They have tried nonetheless to abide by
the rules in Smith by recognizing only those claims similar to the claims of the
plaintiffs in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' the case cited by the Smith Court as an
example of a hybrid claim.3" 2
305. See Davis, supra note 13, at 35 (stating that health care providers lack respect for
Jehovah's Witnesses' medical decision-making; they "see the refusals as formulaic rather than
sincere").
306. 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn, 220 F.3d 1134(9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
307. Id. at 703-11.
308. Id. at 703 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,467 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995)).
309. Id. (citing Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d694, 700(10th Cir. 1998)).
The court in Thomas adopted this approach, only to have the opinion withdrawn on the basis
of a lack of controversy. The court stated that "the dispute is purely hypothetical and the injury
is speculative." Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1137.
Professor Brian Freeman argues that by "hybrid" case, Justice Scalia did not intend
"that, while rational basis review is to be used where either free exercise or the 'other' right
stands alone, when the two are combined it suddenly becomes appropriate to use strict
scrutiny." Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins ofYoder and Smith: Towarda Unified Theory
of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV.

9, 52 (2001). Rather, he argues that Scalia intended that "where the 'other' right was freedom
of speech or press, the 'other' right was itself fully sufficient to invalidate the governmental
action, with no need to rely, even in part, on the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 53.
310. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704 (citing Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.
1993) (calling the hybrid rights category "completely illogical")).
311. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
312. See, e.g., Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. ofEduc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662 (E.D.N.C.
1999) (holding that the rights of parents in a mandatory school uniform case were similar to the
rights implicated in Yoder, hence the plaintiffs' free exercise claims were valid as a hybrid
claim). But see Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 703 (N.D. Tex.
2000) (holding that rights of parents in a mandatory school uniform case were not
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Notwithstanding the development of a hybrid rights theory, nothing in the
lower court cases begin to answer the essential questions left open in Smith
with regard to the hybrid rights category: "[W]hat makes a free exercise claim
qualitatively different from other constitutional claims so that it must be
asserted in combination with other protections in order to be valid?"; "[i]f the
Smith decision is right about the Free Exercise Clause, why is the Free
Exercise Clause in the Constitution at all?"; and fimally, "[w]hy should an
infringement of a particular constitutional right warrant closer scrutiny if that
right is coupled with a free exercise claim?"3 3
Despite the questions Smith and lower court cases have left unanswered,
pregnant women should be able to assert a free exercise claim under either
theory of the hybrid claim that recognizes the hybrid claim as not limited by
the facts in Yoder because pregnant women have independently viable

constitutional companion claims. In the compelled treatment cases, the
women assert the right to refuse medical treatment, which, as I have
discussed, is a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest3 14 as well as a right to
privacy. Indeed, appellate courts in the District of Columbia and Illinois have
refused to order treatment on these grounds.315
For example, In re A. C., the appellate court vacated a trial court order
compelling a cesarean section on a terminally ill pregnant woman." 6 The
court held that it was inappropriate for the trial court to "weigh the state's
interest in preserving the potential life of a viable fetus against [the pregnant

constitutionally significant, hence no hybrid claim was recognized).
313. Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-RightsDoctrine in Free
Exercise Cases,68 TENN. L. REv. 119, 139 (2000). Justice Souter has been most critical of the
hybrid claim category. In Lukumi, Justice Souter reasoned,
[Tihe distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is
simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception
would cover the situation exemplified by Smith .... But if a hybrid claim is one in which
a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable
law under another constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for the
Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at
all.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Hence, perhaps the most plausible
explanation for the hybrid claim category is that the Smith Court sought to dilute the Free
Exercise Clause until it had no independent content, making it redundant of other freedoms
protected by the Constitution. See CARTER, supra note 56, at 129.
314. See supra Part III.A.
315. See, e.g., Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983) (vacating lower court order
compelling a surgical procedure on a pregnant Jehovah's Witness because the lower court failed
to recognize the woman's right of privacy, and the record did not indicate conditions
sufficiently compelling to override her free exercise right).
316. 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
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' The court based its
woman's] interest in having her decision respected."317
decision on the importance of the pregnant woman's right to refuse medical
treatment,3' a8right which encompasses the right to informed consent and bodily
integrity.
Similarly, the Illinois Appellate Court has refused to compel both cesarean
sections and blood transfusions for the sake of the fetus. The court in In re Baby
Boy Doe refused to order a cesarean that the pregnant woman refused on religious
grounds."' The appellate court rejected the state's argument that the trial court
should have balanced the predicted harm to the fetus "against the right of the
competent woman to choose the type of medical care she deemed appropriate."32
The court, relying on the right to refuse medical treatment accepted in Cruzan,
held "that a woman's competent choice in refusing medical treatment as invasive
as a cesarean section during her pregnancy must be honored, even in
circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus."'321 Furthermore, the
court noted that "[t]he potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant; to the
view that the woman's rights can be
contrary, the... court explicitly
3 rejected the
subordinated to fetal rights., The Illinois Appellate Court expanded its analysis on this issue in In reFetus
Brown.3" In that case, the court vacated a trial court order compelling a blood
transfusion on a pregnant Jehovah's Witness, holding that a pregnant woman has
the right to refuse any invasive medical procedure.324 The court refused to accept
the state's argument that blood transfusions are "relatively noninvasive" and as
such are not subject to the court's previous proscription against balancing fetal
interest against those of the pregnant woman.3 2 Instead, the court held that
medical procedure[s]
transfusions, like cesarean section surgeries, are "invasive
326
that interrupt[] a competent adult's bodily integrity.
Hence, pregnant women asserting a right to refuse medical treatment should
be able to successfully assert a free exercise claim under the hybrid case exception
because they have independently viable constitutional claims based on the liberty
and privacy interests implicated in the right to refuse medical treatment.

C. Systems of IndividualizedAssessments and Exemptions

With regard to the individual government assessments or exemptions
Id.
318. Id. at 1242-48.
317.

319.
320.

321.
protected
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

632 N.E.2d 326, 335 (I1. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 330.

Id. The court noted that the woman's right to refuse medical treatment was also
by the state right of privacy, which protects reproductive autonomy. Id. at 33 1.
1988)).
Id. at 332 (citing Staliman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11.
689 N.E.2d 397 (I1.App. Ct. 1997).
Id. at 399, 405.
Id. at 405.

Id.
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cases, the most plausible explanation for exclusion from the Smith umbrella
is that "individualized decisionmaking provides ample opportunity for
'
discrimination against religion in general or unpopular faiths in particular."327
As such, courts must be "highly vigilant in policing these discretionary, caseby-case decisions made by unelected officials.""32 When there are individual
government assessments or exemptions, the courts have held that the
governmental rules are subject to strict scrutiny.329
Carol Kaplan has suggested that a two-step analysis is necessary in order
to succeed in an individual assessment or exemption claim. She states, "The
first [step] focuses on whether a law contains a mechanism similar to the
'good cause' criterion in that it is open to unfettered discretionary
interpretation.... [T]he second step requires courts to determine whether it
is enforced in a discriminatory manner."33 Therefore, under Kaplan's
analysis, it is important to determine whether there have been secular
exemptions but no exemptions for religious purposes or whether there have
been exemptions for members of some religious faiths but not for members of
other faiths. Kaplan asserts that if both of these requirements are not met,
then the individualized assessments or exemptions exception to Smith is not
implicated.3 3 '
One of the leading cases from the lower courts in this area is Rader v.
Johnston.332 Although the court found the policy at issue unconstitutional on
the grounds that it was neither generally applicable nor neutral, the court
relied on an analysis of the policy as a system of individualized exemptions.33
Hence, Rader is useful not only in determining the scope of the general
applicability and neutrality classifications, but also in determining the
contours of the individual exemptions and assessments category. On this
account, the court's analysis in Rader seems to follow Kaplan's suggested
process.
As previously discussed,334 Rader involved a University of Nebraska
parietal rule that required all freshmen to live in dormitories, except those
exempted from the rule by university officials.335 Rader, a freshman and
327. Douglas Laycock, Remnants, supra note 40, at 48.
328. Kaplan, supra note 274, at 1081; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Freedom and
InternationalHuman Rights in the United States Today, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 951, 956
(1998) (arguing that there is a significant threat to religious freedom from bureaucrats who are
insensitive to, or ignorant of, the needs of members of minority religious faiths).
329. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.
Supp. 1540,1550 (D.Neb. 1996).
330. Kaplan, supra note 274, at 1081.
331. Id.
332. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996); see also Laycock, The Supreme Court and
Religious Liberty, supra note 277, at 33-34.
333. Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553.
334. See supra Part IV.A.
335. Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1543.
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evangelical Protestant, wanted to live in a religious group house. 36 The
university policy allowed a university administrator to determine exemptions
on a case-by-case basis. 37 Although throughout the history of the policy, the
university made several exemptions, such as for freshmen with small children
and those with medical problems, 3 the then-current university administrator
never made an exemption for a religious reason. 39 In fact, approximately one
third of the freshmen had been exempted from the parietal rules and were not
required to live in the dormitories. 40 The district court first determined that
the policy contained a mechanism similar to the "good cause" mechanism of
the employment cases because it allowed university officials to make
exemptions on the basis of "significant and truly exceptional
circumstances." 34 ' Second, the court looked at whether the university's "good
cause" policy was enforced in a discriminatory fashion, and found
discrimination because requests based on religious beliefs had never been
granted.342 As a result, the court held that the university's exemptions for
students with "exceptional circumstances" had created a system of
"individualized government assessment[s]" and that the university had
pursued the policy in a discriminatory manner by refusing to extend
exceptions to all freshmen who wished to live elsewhere for religious
reasons. 43 By using a two-step process like that suggested by Kaplan, the
court recognized a successful individual exemptions claim.
I propose that the area of impermissible state action is broader than
Kaplan's two-step process suggests. Smith does not overrule the Court's
earlier and consistent emphasis on the importance ofnon-coercion. Therefore,
a showing of coercion should also trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, after a
showing of unfettered state discretion, the complainant may demonstrate
either that the discretion operated in a discriminatory manner or that the law
is coercive, that is, it coerces individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs. This analysis is supported by the employment cases relied upon by the
Court in Smith in its development of the individualized assessments or
exemptions category. The principal issue in those cases was that the
unemployment compensation statutes mandated conduct forbidden by the
employees' religious beliefs. The Court has repeatedly held such coercion to be

336. Id.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 1544, 1546.
Id. at 1546-47.
Id. at 1548-49, 1554. Laycock points out that Rader "shows how relevant exceptions

can be found in the history of implementation as well as on the face of the rule." Laycock, The
Court and Religious Liberty, supra note 277, at 33.
Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1547, 1551.

Supreme
340.
341.
342,
343.

Id.at 1546, 1553.
Id.at 1554-55.
Id. at 1553; see also id. at 1548, 1554.
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unconstitutional. The Court repeated this particular emphasis inLyng3" and did
nothing to distance itself from it in Smith so long as the government action at
issue was non-neutral, not generally applicable, or consisted of individualized
assessments or exemptions. Hence, if the state action allows for individualized
assessments or exemptions, the Court must then determine whether those
assessments or exemptions are given in a discriminatory manner or whether
the law is coercive in the sense articulated by the Court in Lyng and the
employment cases that preceded it-that is, whether the law mandates
forbidden conduct or forbids mandated conduct. If so, then the state must
demonstrate a compelling interest.
In the case of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women, the
women may assert their free exercise claims under the individualized
assessment or exemption rubric. Again, in order to do so successfully, I argue
that the claimant must demonstrate that there is a process of exemptions
similar to the "good faith" exemptions process of the employment cases that
permits bureaucratic discretion. Then, the claimant must demonstrate either
that the law or policy is enforced in a discriminatory manner, or that the law
or policy is coercive on the claimant's religious beliefs.
The compelled medical treatment cases are replete with unfettered
discretion. The Kolder survey demonstrates the type of discretion exercised
by physicians in their endeavors to compel treatment." ' Out of ninety
respondent hospitals in the survey, twenty-one of them indicated that in the
preceding five-year period, they had sought court orders compelling treatment
of pregnant women, and eighteen orders were issued."' Eighty-one percent
of the court orders obtained involved women who were Black, Latino, or
Asian.34 7 Twenty-five percent of the orders involved women who "did not
speak English as their primary language."" 8 All of the orders involved
women who "were seen at a teaching-hospital clinic or were receiving public
assistance."34 9 Because the survey does not indicate the frequency with which
white women or those of majority religious faith refuse treatment, it may not
be statistically relevant that eighty-one percent of those compelled were
women of color. Nevertheless, the survey strongly indicates the power of
physicians' discretion. In addition, we can see from the cases reported in law
reporters that physicians overwhelmingly seek court orders for women who
refuse treatment on the basis of religious belief. Consequently, all of this
amounts to a fair body of evidence that physicians have an incredible amount
of discretion regarding which non-compliant patients against whom they will
seek judicial enforcement of their treatment preferences, and that this

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
Kolder et al., supra note 5.
Id. at 1192-93.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id.
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discretion is overwhelmingly used against the interests of women of minority
faiths.
As the Kolder survey and the reported cases indicate, bureaucratic
discretionary decision-making is exercised in a discriminatory manner against
a host of women, including women whose treatment decisions are motivated
by religious beliefs. Unlike the cases cited by the Court in Smith, traditional
government bureaucrats do not exercise this discretion. Instead, the unfettered
discretion is practiced by physicians. In this context, physicians are acting as
agents for the state. Physicians are the gatekeepers. They decide what type
of maternal behavior to report to state authorities and which individual
pregnant women to report. The state relies solely on the reporting physician's
and his colleagues' assessments of the proper course of treatment, entirely
disregarding the opinion of the pregnant woman as to what she believes is best
for herself and her fetus. Michelle Oberman explains this process:
When a pregnant woman resists medical advice, the doctor often invests the
fetus with interests and rights that directly coincide with his own personal
treatment preferences. The pregnant woman's interests are then rendered in
direct opposition to those attributed by the doctor to her fetus. Hence, the
"maternal-fetal conflict." Finally, the doctor steps in as a seemingly neutral
arbitrator who is well situated to settle this "conflict." But, as it is the doctor
who identifies the course of action deemed to be "in the fetus's best
interest," the doctor is, by definition, not neutral.'"
Doctors are in fact placed in the role of government agents. They are, in
this context, the pregnancy police. Indeed, this was one of the fears cited by
the American Medical Association that led them to oppose judicially
compelled medical treatment of pregnant women. In their position paper,
Legal InterventionsDuringPregnancy,they state, "Imposing legal duties to
accept medical care on pregnant women may result in concomitant legal
duties for the physician. Such duties may require the physician to act as an
agent of the state rather than as an independent patient counselor.""' 1 In fact,
in many of the cases, the physician or other hospital official is appointed
guardian of the fetus with the power to order whatever treatment the physician
deems necessary or appropriate." 2
In addition, women asserting free exercise claims can also demonstrate
that state action is coercive in the constitutional sense. In Lyng, the Court
explained, "[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
350. Oberman, supra note 1,at 454; see Lisa C.Ikemoto, The Code ofPerfect Pregnancy:
At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and
the Interventionist Mindset ofLaw, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1205, 1288-89 (1992) (stating that people
cede control to physicians because science is believed "to be uncompromising, neutral,...
disinterested... ahistorical and apolitical").
351. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 3, at 2665.
352. See supra Part III.C.

HeinOnline -- 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 619 2001-2002

620

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

government cannot do to the individual .

..

[Vol. 69:563

.""I In the unemployment

compensation cases, the constitutionally significant coercion was the coercion
that "forces [the complainant] to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits... and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work." '54 Here, the governmental coercion is more
significant. It does not simply penalize a religiously motivated act, but rather
it makes that religiously motivated act impossible and includes the attendant
costs of physical invasion. Bette Novit Evans illustrates this point with
respect to compelled blood transfusions:
People who are given court-ordered blood transfusions are simply not able to
practice their religion; their choice-even the choice to act and suffer a
penalty-is effectively removed. They are often physically, as well as legally,
in no position to object to the transfusion; they can only passively receive it.
I suggest that this burden is even more powerful than is typically recognized.
Unlike laws penalizing religious actions, which aperson may choose to violate,
these laws simply remove the opportunity to engage in the act.35
Judicial orders compelling medical treatment expressly, and sometimes
physically, force these women to violate their religious beliefs by engaging in
conduct forbidden by their religious beliefs, such as blood transfusions and
cesarean sections. Here, there is no issue of corresponding benefit from the
government to the complainant. There is only physical force and the coercion
through the law. This physical coercion must be as constitutionally
significant, if not more, than the coercion involved in the employment cases.
This type of physical coercion by the government must be part and parcel of
the coercion forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause if the Free Exercise
Clause is to maintain any meaning.
Consequently, with regard to the individualized assessment or exemption
exception, pregnant women asserting free exercise claims for their resistance
to treatment can demonstrate all three prongs of the test I articulated. They
can show that the exemptions are discretionary, that they are exercised in a
discriminatory manner, and that the state action is impermissibly coercive.
Hence, these pregnant women's claims are subject to strict scrutiny. The state
must demonstrate that its interest is sufficiently compelling to override the
women's free exercise of religion.
V. CONCLUSION

Most pregnant women comply with the treatment plans outlined by
physicians. This is especially true when the health or life of a fetus may be
353.
(quoting
354.
355.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
EVANS, supra note 30, at 189.
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compromised. When pregnant women refuse medical treatment based on their
religious beliefs, we are required to ask the moral question: to what extent do
we tolerate religious difference? We are also obliged to ask the corresponding
legal question of how much tolerance is constitutionally due. This last
question is at the heart of this Article.
Although the vast majority of the reported cases involve pregnant women
who assert religious freedom as the basis for their refusals, neither scholars
nor courts sufficiently address the free exercise claim. Scholars tend to
address the claims of these women exclusively under the privacy rubric.
Courts are inclined to address these claims by focusing primarily on the state's
interest in the fetus or the fetus's right to life. In this Article, I consider the
problem from both of these vantage points in order to more clearly focus our
attention on the question of what is required under current free exercise
jurisprudence. Should pregnant women be able to resist non-consensual
medical treatment on the basis of religious freedom? In answering this
question, I fill in some of the missing pieces to the inquiry of how much
religious tolerance is constitutionally mandated.
The Court in Smith severely limited free exercise accommodations by
holding that neutral laws of general applicability burdening the exercise of
religion were no longer subject to strict scrutiny. Hence, in these cases, the
state no longer has to demonstrate a compelling interest in order to override
a claimant's right to religious exercise. Nevertheless, the court expressed two
exceptions to this rule, cases of hybrid claims and cases in which the state
engages in discretionary exemptions or assessments.
The cases of pregnant women who refuse medical treatment on behalf of
their fetuses for religiously motivated reasons demand the application of strict
scrutiny. Their claims are posited against laws that are not generally
applicable. In addition, they are asserting hybrid claims, in that their free
exercise claims are connected to independently viable constitutional
companion claims. Moreover, their claims are part of a discretionary system
of assessments and exemptions that provide "ample opportunity for
356
discrimination against religion in general or unpopular faiths in particular.
Under these conditions, Smith requires that the state demonstrate a compelling
state interest sufficient to outweigh the pregnant woman's constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment, make treatment decisions for herself and her
fetus, and practice her religious beliefs.
As I have argued, the state's interest in a viable fetus is not compelling
outside the context of abortion. Hence, the state should not have the
constitutional authority to compel treatment when the pregnant woman has
refused to consent, particularly when her religious belief is the basis of her
non-consent. Although the state may have an interest in the fetus, this interest
is not absolute. Roe and its progeny clearly affirm that women continue to
have a constitutional interest to dictate their own health care even in the third
356.

Laycock, Remnants, supra note 40, at 48.
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trimester of pregnancy, after fetal viability. Nor does the state interest in the
fetus eviscerate the interest that the pregnant woman has in her fetus. Nothing
in the abortion jurisprudence empowers the state to do so. Because the state
cannot show an interest of sufficient significance, physicians' attempts to
judicially compel treatment in the face of religious objections should fail as
an impermissible burden on women's free exercise of religion.
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